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The thesis explores the case of medical methods of treatment and their 
patentability or lack thereof, depending on the jurisdiction. Consider medical 
devices, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology: these are all theoretically 
patentable (if the requirements are met, of course, and after much debate and 
controversy in many cases), and this presumably controls the market and aids 
in the protection of the public through the creation of products that are carefully 
designed and produced. Medical methods of treatment, however, are afforded 
no such protection in approximately 80 countries, including those governed by 
the European Patent Convention (EPC), which raises the question: how can a 
novel method or treatment be used for the well-being of the public, if these 
novelties cannot be adequately disseminated via the patent system? For a 
number of reasons, methods of medical treatment have historically been 
excluded from patent protection in many jurisdictions. Two fundamental 
questions thus act as justification for the chosen research topic, firstly, why this 
is so, and secondly, should it be so?  
 
The jurisdictions examined are the countries signatory to the European Patent 
Convention, contrasted with the USA and Australia, in an effort to create a 
legislative comparative analysis with the hope of illuminating the issue from a 
variety of perspectives, since legal systems are created and coloured by the 
social systems that surround them. These three jurisdictions are considered 
here with the aim of illuminating international comparisons between the 
countries bound by the EPC and two large common law jurisdictions where 
patenting medical methods of treatment is permitted, at least in theory if not 
always in practice, and with whom the EPC countries may often share some 
convergence in the sense of legal culture. The aim of the comparative analysis 
is to generate further clarity regarding why methods of medical treatment are 
legislated for differently in the aforementioned jurisdictions and from there to 
consider the validity – or indeed invalidity – of patenting medical treatment 
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Part I  
 
 
Introduction to the Research Question 
 
 
“The insurmountable problem, from a public policy viewpoint, of drawing 
a logical distinction which would justify allowing patentability for a 




Concerns regarding to what extent creators and inventors in the life sciences, 
such as medicine and biotechnology, should be capable of obtaining property 
protection for their intellectual efforts frequently come to the fore, with opinions 
oscillating between extensive protection with lengthy intellectual property rights, 
and no protection at all. The first supposition predominantly arises from the 
perspective that medical and biotech creators should be equally as entitled to 
intellectual property protection as those in other fields, since presumably their 
creative efforts are correspondingly valid; moreover this particular field can 
frequently cost a great deal more that many others in terms of development 
(both financially and in a time-consuming regulatory sense),2 and creativity 
would be stunted without the incentive of property rights and possible financial 
reward. The other end of the pendulum swing has ethical edges, however, and 
opponents can maintain either a) that these sciences exist first and foremost to 
serve the needs of people and animals; by protecting valuable inventions in 
these fields, fair and equal access for all to e.g. the latest and more effective 
treatment for illness, is hampered, sometimes to the extent that access is 
                                                     
1 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co. Ltd, 2000, as stated by the Australian Federal Court 
2 See e.g. Mayfield (2016), p. 1 
 6 
unattainable, or b) the type of patent sought is too contrary to human morality, 
e.g. embryonic stem cell research and patents.3 Thus, instead of these possible 
restrictions, the ethical argument can support the idea that all information and 
discoveries in medicine should pass freely throughout the community, or that 
the manner in which the subject matter of the patent is created is too 
controversial to support.  
 
 
What the moral argument often overlooks, however, is that without incentive, 
the will to create can be dulled. Put simply, intellectual property rights serve to 
provide that incentive to create, by protecting valuable inventions and offering 
potential financial reward. Without the possibility of patents in medicine for 
instance, access to e.g. effective care could be reduced, ostensibly causing 
those in need to suffer unnecessarily. If creators of intellectual property in other 
fields can differentiate themselves from their competitors, then why not those 
in the life sciences? As always, the law purports to create a balance somewhere 
between these competing interests, while the debate continues regarding the 
relative success of the legislators in drafting suitable laws and the judiciary in 
applying them. In the words of Leon Kass: “…the contract formed by the patent 
law brings together, in stressful if fertile union, certain contradictory, or at least 
inhospitable, partners and principles: self-interest and common good; 
monopoly and liberty; the ownership of ideas and the shareability or publicity of 
speech and thought.”4 
 
 
Wider context aside, this paper endeavours to discuss specifically the case of 
medical methods of treatment and their patentability or lack thereof, depending 
on the jurisdiction. Consider medical devices, pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology: these are all theoretically patentable (if the requirements are 
met, of course, and after much debate and controversy in many cases), and 
this presumably controls the market and helps protect the public by creating 
                                                     
3 See e.g. Stazi (2015), p 120. 
4 Cass, L (1981), p 580 
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products that are carefully designed and produced. Medical methods, however, 
are afforded no such protection in approximately 80 countries,5 including those 
governed by the European Patent Convention (EPC), which raises the 
question: how can a novel method or treatment be used for the well-being of 
the public, if these novelties cannot be adequately disseminated via the patent 
system? For a number of reasons methods of medical treatment have 
historically been excluded from patent protection in many jurisdictions. Two 
fundamental questions thus act as justification for the chosen research topic, 
firstly, why this is so, and secondly, should it be so?  
 
 
Medical methods are viewed as falling into three separate categories: surgical, 
diagnostic, and therapeutic, and the extent to which they are patentable 
depends upon the jurisdiction. This thesis seeks to explore some of the history 
behind the inclusions to and exclusions from patentability for these methods, in 
the hope of providing some context and justification for the patentability of 
medical methods of treatment. For example, methods of medical treatment are 
excluded under Article 53 (c ) of the European Patent Convention: “methods for 
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic 
methods practiced on the human or animal body;”6, and it has usually been 
understood, at least before the EPO’s revision of the EPC in 2000 (hitherto this 
exclusion was contained in Article 52(4) of the EPC 1973), that this was on the 
grounds of medical methods’ not being susceptible of industrial application.7 As 
the EPO have stated in their proposal from 2000 prior to the EPC’s revision: “It 
is undesirable to uphold this fiction [lack of industrial application] since methods 
of treatment and diagnostic methods are excluded from patentability in the 
interests of public health.”8 So here we have a clear instance of their being 
excluded for one reason, which was then revised as being for an entirely 
different reason. This is not all, however, since a further explanation was then 
given for the intent behind Article 53(c), which reveals an insight into the EPO’s 
                                                     
5 Rastogi (2014), p 1 
6 EPC, art 53(c)  
7 EPC (1973), art 52(4) 
8 OJ EPO (2007), p 50 
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mindset regarding the reason for this article’s existence, or at the very least, 
the EPO’s reason: “it must be borne in mind that the intention of art. 53(c) is 
only to free from restraint non-commercial and non-industrial activities.”9 Thus, 
once again, another justification was declared for the excluding medical 
methods from patent protection.  
 
 
Aside from industrial applicability and commercial/industrial activities, 
arguments have included angles such as whether allowing a patent would 
cause a conflict of interest (i.e. that for instance a doctor would choose his or 
her patented method over a more suitable one),10 or whether it would interfere 
with the flow of information owing to the lengthy patent process. The issue may 
then either be constrained by medical law, by patent law, by historical 
precedent, or by various combinations of all three. These developments will be 
considered in terms of how justifiable they are against the lack of intellectual 
property protection under the EPC for medical method inventors.  
 
 
Focus and methodology 
 
The jurisdictions to be examined will be the countries signatory to the European 
Patent Convention in contrast with the USA and Australia, in an effort to create 
a legislative comparative analysis in the hope of illuminating the issue from a 
variety of perspectives, since legal systems are created and coloured by the 
social systems that surround them, for instance, a particular jurisdiction’s 
societal view of morality can differ widely from another’s. As Jaakko Husa 
states: “In comparative methodology a matter is merely a technical problem 
only very rarely. The mental challenge of comparison comes from the difference 
in legal cultures – diversity and hybridity present their own challenges.”11 These 
three jurisdictions are considered here in the hope of drawing international 
comparisons between the countries bound by the EPC and two large common 
                                                     
9 EPO, Guidelines for examination, Part G, 4.2.1 
10 Meier (1997), p 265 
11 Husa (2015), p 15 
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law jurisdictions where patenting medical methods of treatment is permitted, at 
least in theory if not always in practice, and with whom the EPC countries may 
often share some convergence in the sense of legal culture. Regarding the 
concept of legal culture, it can be said that in many ways the laws of these 
jurisdictions and the codification thereof are sometimes quite alike, at least in 
terms of the topic at hand, but the end results can vary considerably.  
 
The aforementioned medical treatment methods - therapeutic, diagnostic, and 
surgical - will be examined in order to identify how they are defined in the three 
jurisdictions under examination, as well as issues such as possible limitations 
that would influence any exclusions, and also consider what factors the courts 
have considered when interpreting the laws in terms of the patent claims 
brought before them. The comparative models involved include historical 
considerations, e.g. Chapter 3 examines the unfolding of the legislation 
surrounding the patentability of these methods via judiciary decisions, with 
some direct comparison between different cases and jurisdictions as relevant. 
This is examined in light of the differences between the methods themselves 
and how those differences are interpreted, as well the justifications for the 
exclusions, be they based on ethical considerations, lack of industrial 
application, or some other reason. The overall aim of the comparative analysis 
is to generate further clarity regarding why methods of medical treatment are 
legislated for differently in the aforementioned jurisdictions and from there to 
consider the validity – or indeed invalidity – of patenting medical treatment 
methods on the basis of the cases and legislation discussed.  
 
This thesis will also consider other issues that to a lesser extent affect the 
discussion, such as how excluding patent protection for methods of medical 
treatment could also be applicable to pharmaceuticals; indeed, arguing against 
one while supporting the other might be criticised for failing to take into the 
account the considerable overlap between the two. Where is the distinction and 
can it be adequately determined and thereby justified? While examining the 
arguments against patent protection for methods of medical treatment, this 
thesis will attempt to highlight, where necessary and possible, the differences 
 10 
between these two areas of invention. Other aspects of the discussion will 
include comparative angles such as law and ethics/morality, and the 
advancement of medicine in general, since the development of artificial 
intelligence and personalised medicine in the realm of medical treatment, for 











1 Patents in general, medical patents, and development in 




1.1 General patent requirements: A Legislative overview by jurisdiction 
 
 
Upon the creation of an invention, the creator can choose to patent that 
invention. Patents are time-limited rights that exist to protect inventions, or to 
put it another way, it can be described as a negative right that protects the rights 
of the creator in relation to that invention regarding distribution and usage, since 
it excludes others from selling, using or making copies12, hence the use of the 
term ‘negative right’. Such protection is designed to function as a type of price 
paid by society to encourage innovation and creativity. Among all intellectual 
property rights, patents offer the most significant protection to their holders, 
                                                     
12 Frankel et al (2016), p 89 
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meaning they are highly sought-after, although the process of obtaining a 
patent is more challenging, than e.g. copyright, since any claim must be 
examined by the relevant patent office.13 For the purposes of the comparative 
discussions that will take place below, at the time of writing, the three 
jurisdictions under discussion in this paper are signatories to the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement). This 
agreement came into force in 1995 and all the members of the World Trade 
Organisation are signatories to it. The pertinent section pertaining to the subject 
at hand is article 27, which outlines the three criteria for obtaining a patent for 
an invention, namely that the invention must be novel, it must have what is 
referred to as an inventive step and it must be industrially applicable14. These 
three criteria are interpreted, worded and legislated for somewhat differently in 
the three jurisdictions under discussion and the criteria will be examined in 






Patenting in the European Patent Convention Community: overview 
 
 
Founded in 1978, the European Patent Convention is a multinational treaty to 
which 38 nations are signatories (this includes all the member states of the 
European Union and all non-members are also European countries). The 
purpose of the treaty was to create an office where European patents claims 
could be examined, thus creating the existence of a common standard for 
member states, and, once granted a patent, the holder is entitled to rights 
throughout all the member states that are the identical to the national patent 
rights normally granted within each state. The length of a standard patent term 
in Europe under the EPC is twenty years from the filing date. Since the vast 
                                                     
13 Waelde et al (2013), p 365 
14 TRIPS, art. 27(1), in section 5  
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majority of member states that are signatories to the convention are also 
members of the World Trade Organisation, the provisions of the Paris 
Convention and the TRIPS agreement that are relevant to patenting have been 
included in the convention.15 
 
For a patent claim to be valid, there must be an invention, which is the essential 
subject matter for patent eligibility, thus distinguishing that which is patentable 
from unpatentable.  In the provisions of the European Patent Convention, the 
concept of invention is mostly defined in negative terms, i.e. by describing what 
an invention is not.16 Creations not viewed as inventions include methods and 
theories, as well as, for example, sets of rules for carrying out particular 
activities, such as games, or operating computer programmes. Rule 43 of the 
Convention provides that the invention must be defined in technical terms17, i.e. 
that it possesses some kind of technical features that relate to a problem of a 
technical nature.18 
This is provided in Article 52(1) EPC as inventions from any field that are “new, 
involve an inventive step, and are susceptible of industrial application”19; i.e. 
these three steps from the test for patentability, and these concepts will be 






Patenting in the USA: overview 
 
The first US Patent Act came into force in 1790 and went through many 
revisions and iterations before becoming codified in the United States Code.20 
Published for the first time in 1926, this Code is comprised of a collection of the 
                                                     
15 See e.g. EPC, art. 87. 
16 See EPC, art. 52(2) 
17 EPC, Case Law of the Boards of Appeal. 9.1.1 Technical character of an invention 
18 EPC, Rule 43 (Form and content of claims), 1(a) 
19 EPC, Art. 52(1) 
20 See United States Code info at govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscode 
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laws of the USA by subject. Title 35 concerns patents. Article 1, section 8 of the 
US Constitution states that power is invested in the United States Congress to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”21   
 
 
While the patents are mostly overseen by the US Code Title 35,22 the USA is 
also a common law country, meaning that the decisions made by the federal 
court play an important role in litigation with regard to patent cases, given that 
its jurisdiction in infringement cases is exclusive, and the decisions and 
constitutional interpretations can be binding on state courts. Only the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appellate cases in claims 
relating to patents.23 With regard to the examination and granting of patents, 
the USPTO (the US Patent Office, part of the Department of Commerce) is 
responsible for the administration side of patenting, as well as officiating patent 
challenges between parties. For a “inventions patentable”24 to be granted by 
the USPTO, there are four requirements that form the test for patentability: the 
invention should consist of statutory subject matter; it should be new; it must 
be useful; and finally the invention must be non-obvious (see below for further 
discussion on these steps). Regarding the types of patent, three general types 
exist, namely utility patents, plant patents and design patents.25 As these 
names suggest, the utility patents constitute the most common type of patent, 
and the purpose is to seek protection over the invention’s essential concept. 
Design patents, however, serve the function of protecting other aspects of 
product, namely those involving appearance ad aesthetics. These kinds of 
patents are often sought for consumer products, and, unlike utility patents, 
which are granted 20 years protection, design patents are allowed 15 years, 
but are considered easier to obtain.26 In line with its name, a plant patent can 
                                                     
21 United States Constitution, Art 1, S.8 (8) 
22 35 U.S. Code Title 35 - Patents 
23 Murphy et al (2015), p.5 
24 35 U.S.C. § 101 
25 Murphy et al (2015), p. 5 
26 For a practical guide to inventions and patents in the USA; eee Tidwell et al (2017), pp 391-98 
 14 
be sought when an inventor has both discovered/invented and reproduced 










Patenting in Australia: overview 
 
Given Australia’s shared history with the United Kingdom, it is not surprising 
that the two jurisdictions share a similar approach to patenting and Australia 
originally based much of its legislation upon the UK Patents Act of 1883. The 
Australian Commonwealth Parliament was founded in 1901, upon which law-
making power was granted to that parliament via Section 5128 of the new 
Australian Constitution.29 Included in this power was that of making laws 
relating to intellectual property, which was then legislated for in the provisions 
of the Patents Act 1903. This Act has undergone several amendments and 
was redrafted in 1952 and again in 1990, which is the current version under 
which patents are legislated for in Australia. Alongside the Patents Act 1990, 
the Patents Regulations 1991 was enacted to serve as a regulatory 
complement to the Patents Act. The administration of patent rights is the 
responsibility of the government authority IP Australia.30 The ACIP (Advisory 
Council on Intellectual Property) is a government appointed independent 
                                                     
27 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, ‘General information concerning patents’ at ‘Plant 
Patents’ 
28 The Australian Constitution, Part V ‘Powers of the Parliament¨’, section 51 ‘Legislative powers of 
the Parliament’, xviii. 
29 Australia became a federated nation at this time, before which it had been comprised of a 
collection of colonies, each of which had its own legislation. 
30 See ipaustralia.gov.au 
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council that advises the relevant government ministers (e.g. Industry) on 
policy issues relating to intellectual property.31 
 
 
Section 18 of the Patents Act provides that for an invention to be protected by 
patent, there are five key requirements that must be satisfied: the manner of 
manufacture is in line with the meaning of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, s. 6; 
the invention must be novel; the invention must include an inventive step (these 
two criteria - novelty and inventive step - are listed separately but within the 
same subsection, as opposed to the other three requirements, which are 
provided discretely under section 1);32 it must be useful; and finally the invention 
must not have been used in Australia in secret prior to the priority date (see the 






EPC: Novelty & the inventive step 
 
“An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state 
of the art.”33 On receipt of a patent application, the patent office in question 
must examine the state of the art in the relevant field in order to determine if 
the invention’s technical features are completely new. The purpose of this step 
is in an effort to eliminate patent claims with regard to material that had already 
received a patent, referred to as ‘prior art’34, regardless of whether or not that 
patent has expired. Moreover, it also serves to prohibit the grant of a patent to 
subject matter that is already known to the public, i.e. if the invention is 
something that has already been used, albeit without patent in the relevant field, 
                                                     
31 Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (2015), Review of the Innovation Patent System  
32 Patents Act 1990, sect 18 (1) 
33 EPC, Art. 54(1) 
34 EPO, Guide for Applicants 2017: How to get a European Patent, II Basic Principles: Novelty, under B: 
Patentability 
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the novelty criterion renders it unpatentable, thus protecting those prior users. 
This process can be substantially more difficult in fields like biotechnology and 
medicine, owing to the depth of knowledge required and the extent and volume 
of the research and literature already in existence. The state of the art, 
synonymous with ‘prior art’ mentioned above, according to the EPO, 
“comprises everything made available to the world by means of a written or oral 
description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing or priority.”35 It 
follows that without novelty36, inventiveness cannot be shown.  
 
 
“An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having 
regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”37 
For this step to be fulfilled, a person skilled in the relevant field is considered 
as a benchmark for the purposes of determining whether or not the invention 
would have been obvious to an individual with the requisite knowledge. The 
concept of such a person is not defined in the EPC, but rather in case law 
arising from the Board of Appeal and various European courts.38 While 
technically fictional, the purpose is to elucidate what such a skilled person 
would know and whether they could have developed the same result based on 
their own knowledge. This should serve to show if the invention, as with novelty, 
is inventive with regard to the technical features therein.39 
 
 
The concepts of novelty and inventive step serve different legal functions, with 
the concept of non-obviousness in the inventive step helping to show the 
difference between the two, i.e. that what is new must also not be obvious. To 
portray this distinction using a very simple example, if a brush is resigned with 
a different shape, let’s say for the sake of some ergonomic effect, if it can be 
                                                     
35 Ibid. See also EPC, Art. 54(2).  
36 Novelty should be global in scale, i.e. new throughout the world, as shown in C-428/08 Monsanto 
Technology LLS v Cefetra BB and Others [2010], in para 45. 
37 EPC, Art. 56 
38 EPO, 3. Person skilled in the art, under Chapter IV: Inventive step in G: Patentability 
39 For a case concerning the knowledge required to ascertain the existence of an inventive step, see T 
32/81 (Cleaning apparatus for a conveyor belt) of 5.3.1982 
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shown that such a shaped brush hitherto did not exist, then it is novel. If, 
however, a person knowledgeable in the art of brushes could not reasonably 




EPC: Industrial application  
 
 
While the US Constitution speaks of the promotion of the ’useful arts’, the 
equivalent concept within the EPC is perhaps phrased more conservatively, 
through the stipulation that the invention has to be of a ‘technical character’.40 
As mentioned above, the word ‘technical’ here is used in reference to the 
invention’s features, the problem (which the invention purports to solve) and its 
field. An invention’s ‘technical character’, if adequately shown, thus serves to 
distinguish the activity from activities in aesthetic and performing arts, i.e. the 
arts that presumably are considered to lack the necessary technical character, 
rendering them insusceptible of industrial application. Interestingly, despite the 
liberal use of the word ‘technical’ in the Guidelines, no actual definition is given 
in the Convention for what is precisely meant by the term. It can perhaps be 
presumed that such a definition is lacking from the EPC owing to the ever-
evolving nature of technology, such that future technological advancements 
would suffer as a result of an express definition. This lack of meaningful 
definition, however, gives rise to a lack of legal certainty in patent 
considerations. Moreover, in the words of Bakels: “Exclusion of non-technical 




Put simply (lack of sufficient definition aside), for the EPC’s final criterion to be 
met adequately, it fundamentally requires that the invention can be made and 
                                                     
40 See the EPO’s Guidelines for Examination, Part G 2, ii 
41 Bakels (2008), p 56 
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used in an industry42. In many instances, or at least in many industries, this 
concept was often readily met and could almost be viewed as a formality in the 
sense that most inventions traditionally have been physical things which served 
a technical purpose or solved a technical problem. The decision T 870/04 of 
the EPO Board of Appeal regarding a substance, however, made this step more 
demanding, on the grounds that the substance must also have a use that is 
profitable.43 This revision would seem to serve a practical purpose, since what 
would be the point of going to such lengths (financial and otherwise) to obtain 
a patent if the invention itself would prove to be economically worthless? In any 
case, because of this physical or tangible feature of industrial applicability, it 
has been here that the stumbling blocks for life sciences industries such as 
medicine have often occurred. This stems partly from the reasoning that many 
inventions in this field are more abstract in nature, or intangible, thus their use 
in the field is harder to define or display, meaning such inventions have not lent 
themselves easily to proof of industrial application. This will be examined in 






USA: statutory invention 
 
 
“Inventions patentable: Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”44 
 
                                                     
42 EPC, Art. 57  
43 “Merely because a substance could be produced in some ways does not necessarily mean that the 
requirements of Article 57 EPC are fulfilled, unless there is also some profitable use for which the 
substance can be employed.” EPO T 870/04 (BDP1 Phosphatase/MAX PLANCK) of 11.5.2005, no. 4 
under Reasons for the Decision. 
44 35 U.S.C. § 101 
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There are four statutory categories of invention under US patent law: machine, 
useful process, manufacture, and composition of matter; any invention that 
does not fall within at least one of these categories cannot be patentable. 
Conversely, if an invention should partly fall outside of all four categories, even 
though it partly lies within at least one of them, it will be rejected under §101.45 
These four terms are given brief - yet what appear to be clear - definitions on 
the face of things (case law may indeed tell another story), with a machine 
described as “a concrete thing consisting of parts”, while a ‘process’ constitutes 
an act, “or series of steps.”46 For the manufacture requirement to be fulfilled, 
the invention must be made from materials whether prepared or raw such that 
they thereafter have new properties or forms. Regarding the fulfilment of the 
‘composition of matter’ patent category: as the name implies, the invention must 
involve the combination of at least two substances, regardless of their physical 
matter or whether they are mechanical or chemical in substance. The 
categories of invention that are expressly excluded from patentability have 
been created through case law by the Supreme Court; abstract ideas, physical 
phenomena, and laws of nature.47 Interestingly, since the US Code does not 
specify categories that should be excluded, it is the opinion of Oppenheimer 
that the Court has exceeded its mandate in expressly denying patentability to 
these three categories, potentially harming development in e.g. the fields of 
biotech and software, and he goes so far as to say that the withdrawal of such 
protection hampers the progress in these areas; taking away the right to 







                                                     
45 See cases e.g. Digitech Image Technologies and In re Ferguson for examples of non-statutory 
examples of (unsuccessful) patent claims. 
46 35 U.S.C. § 101 
47 Oppenheimer (2012), p 4 and USPTO, ‘General information concerning patents’ at ‘What can be 
patented’. 
48 Ibid. p 5 
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USA: non-obviousness and novelty 
 
 
Despite the commonly quoted Supreme Court phrase claiming: “anything under 
the sun made by man”49 is patentable,50 the reality is decidedly more restrained. 
As with the EPC, once usefulness can be established, the prior art is taken into 
consideration when examining patent eligibility, since knowledge of what has 
come before is necessary in determining the newness or novelty of the 
invention being inspected. In order for this to take place, the invention is 
considered in light of the concepts of novelty, as well as non-obviousness. 
These concepts sound similar, meaning it might be easy to confuse or conflate 
the two, but they do in fact serve different functions in examining patent 
eligibility and are located in different areas of the code: § 102 and § 103, 
respectively.  If the prior art is considered to have anticipated the invention, it 
will be ineligible for patenting. Involved in this process is the precise definition 
of the nature of the invention, after which it is compared to the relevant prior art 
in that field, a process akin to that in Europe.  
 
 
The novelty requirement in § 102 of the Patent Code denies patentability if the 
invention can be shown to exist in the prior art. There are three steps involved 
in defeating novelty; the invention or reference to the invention must have 
existed for at least a year before the date of filing, each individual element of 
the proposed invention must be evident in this reference of prior art, and finally 
the reference must enable a person skilled in the art to create the invention 
without unreasonable effort, thus the invention can be said to have been 
anticipated and novelty is defeated.51 
 
 
                                                     
49 Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
50 35 U.S.C. 103: Conditions for Patentability; Non-Obvious Subject Matter 
51 Seymore (2011), p 923 
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Thus, it can be determined that the existence of an inventive step (see above) 
is also evident in U.S patent law, but it is generally referred to as non-
obviousness. In order to show non-obviousness in a patent claim, the patentee 
should be able to demonstrate that the elements combined to produce the 
invention in its entirety would not have been reasonably expected by others 
skilled in the art. According to Mueller & Brean, non-obviousness is the most 
challenging requirement of US patent law: “An applicant for patent must take a 
“large step” forward, establishing that its [the patent’s] advance would not have 
been obvious”.52 It follows that this process is highly subjective, and must be 














Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies is concerned with what is patentable and 
exclusions therefrom, and it excludes patents for inventions that are contrary to 
law, that might hurt trade, or that are viewed as ‘generally inconvenient’.53 
Needless to say, the fact that the statute was written a considerable time ago 
makes this provision of Australian patent law quite fascinating in terms of its 
longevity and persistence in regulating modern patent applications.  
 
 
                                                     
52 Mueller et al (2009), p 424 
53 Statute of Monopolies 1623, s. 6 
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A landmark case in Australia became the benchmark for defining what 
constitutes falling within this meaning of manner of manufacture in terms of 
patentability, namely National Research Development Corporation v 
Commissioner of Patents (NRDC).54 Prior to this case, the classes that had 
developed over time as to what constituted patentable inventions in terms of 
the manner of their manufacture were clear in theory, e.g. ideas and natural 
principles were excluded, but no consistent reasoning existed that justified the 
exclusion of certain types and classes of inventions from patent eligibility, such 
as horticultural methods and methods of medical treatment.55 In a previous 
case, Re GEC’s Application, Justice Morton created a definition of what might 
constitute a manner of manufacture, in which there were three possibilities: the 
process or method must result in either a ‘vendible’ product, a vendible product 
that is improved or restored by the method/process,  or lastly a preservative 
effect upon a vendible product.56 It was the position of the High Court in NRDC 
that the Justice Morton’s formula, particularly the terms ‘vendible’ and ‘product’ 
required a broad interpretation. The  High Court thus held that the horticultural 
method in question was patentable, despite it being a horticultural method that 
would hitherto have been excluded, since the court claimed that the word 
‘manufacture’ was troublesome in its application, and gave rise to the 
impression that only something tangible would be patentable.57 This decision 
to grant a broad interpretation to the concept of a vendible product such that it 
need not be a palpable object meant that the way was opened for the potential 






                                                     
54 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252; (1961) 
RPC 134; 1A IPR 63 
55 Monotti (2006), p 461 
56 G.E.C.’s Application (1943) 60 RPC 1 
57 To the Court’s mind, asking whether a proposed invention was a manner of manufacture led to this 
erroneous view of a patentable invention as purely tangible. In their view, the correct question should 
be: “Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have been developed 




Australia: novelty and the inventive step 
 
Novelty is determined in Australian patent law through what is known as the 
reverse infringement test. This term refers to the process by which all relevant 
and publicly available information from the prior art concerning the proposed 
invention is shown clearly and unequivocally. If all the essential features of the 
invention are displayed in the prior art, for example in a patent application that 
was published at an earlier date, the invention will fail the novelty requirement. 
Failing this requirement is tied to whether or not the prior art information was 
publicly available, whether through an act or collection or acts, or through 
documentation.58 Cases concerning public availability have ruled, for instance, 
that the language of the prior art is immaterial, i.e. if documentation exists in 
another language but with regard to the same product, it is enough that  person 
skilled in the art would understand it such that the novelty requirement would 
not be fulfilled.59 
 
 
The provision regarding the inventive step and how it is phrased in Australia’s 
Patents Act seems a little more cumbersome than in the EPC or the US, since 
(similarly to the other jurisdictions under discussion here) it stipulates the 
necessity of the comparison with the prior art, and whether or not it is obvious 
to a person skilled in the art, but it also states that this must be in line with the 
“common general knowledge as it existed (whether in or out of the patent area) 
before the priority date”.60 In fact, it has been the opinion of commenters that 
the inventive step standard is too low,61 and Australia amended the law in 2012 
via the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act. This 
                                                     
58 Australian Law Reform Commission (2010), 6. Patentability of Genetic Materials and Technologies - 
Novelty 
59 See Dennison Manufacturing Co v Monarch Manufacturing Systems Inc (1983) 66 ALR 265 
60 Patents Act 1990, s 7, Inventive step (2) and (3) 
61 See for instance, the Emperor Sports case, wherein an inventor of a type of strip that can torn off 
during Australian rules football passed the test for inventiveness, despite the existence of an identical 
product in American football, since the court determined that the person skilled in the art could not 
have been expected to have known this.  
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intention behind this act was to bring Australian patent law more in line with 
jurisdictions such as the US and Europe, and it included updates such as that 
the general common knowledge should be of a worldwide nature, rather than 
limited merely to Australia.62  
 
 
For the time being, at least, thus worthy of mention here, Australia currently still 
has a form of patent available known as an ‘innovation patent’. This type of 
patent serves a second-tier function, in that it has been available for inventions 
that may not necessarily meet the criteria for being sufficiently inventive but are 
nevertheless innovative enough to warrant some kind of patent protection (a 
term of 8 years). The chief difference rests on the innovative patent system’s 
lack of requirement for an inventive step.63 These will no longer be available as 
of August 2021, since the system was repealed by the Intellectual Property 
Laws Amendments (Productivity Commission Response Part 2 and Other 
Measures) Bill 2019; apparently, according to IP Australia these patents were 
not aiding SMEs in the world of intellectual property as initially hoped, owing to 










Thus far, for introductory purposes, the discussion has focussed on patenting 
and patent legislation in the three selected jurisdictions at a general level. This 
                                                     
62 For more details on these legislative changes, see for example IP Australia’s summary: Intellectual 
Property Reform in Australia (2013), p 3 
63 ALRC (2010) 5. Domestic Legal Framework – Types of Patents 




section is intended to provide some brief broader context to the discussion at 
hand in this paper, through the examination and discussion of patenting 
processes in other life science fields, namely biotechnology and medical 
devices. The purpose is to demonstrate briefly the ways in which the fields 
share similarities and draw attention to some questions regarding the express 
exclusion of medical methods of treatment from patentability by the EPC, when 
other fields of innovation bear striking resemblances. The section will then take 
a short look at advancements in the medical field and how the world of patenting 














Perhaps one the most central concerns regarding patenting medical methods 
of treatment involves the issue of supply. Once the method is patented it means 
that there is a form of direct control regarding its supply. Of course, the situation 
is to all intents and purposes identical to that of pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, since the patent holders could theoretically limit supply or charge 
exorbitant prices, but it is not feasible that it would be in the patent holder’s 
interests to behave in such a manner. Thus, as with e.g. medical devices or 
drugs, a doctor holding a method patent could, at least in theory, restrict the 
licensing of the method, thus stunting its dissemination and availability in the 
wider medical community, but again, this is not in the inventor’s interests, not 
to mention the fact of how it would not be in keeping with the public good. It 
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could be arguable that the situation might be a cause for greater concern in 
cases involving medical treatment, since drugs can be manufactured, sold, and 
distributed. If licenses are withheld for some reason, i.e. that the patent holder 
is unable to make theme widely available, then a reasonable solution might be 
compulsory licensing and/or collective rights agencies. Of course, this is a mere 
theory, and would need further examination in terms of effects on dissemination 




1.3 Considering medical advancement  
 
For many of us, understanding what is truly meant by artificial intelligence is 
beyond our grasp without extensive research; perhaps this situation is further 
hindered by the fact that it is difficult to locate any one perfect definition of what 
artificial intelligence actually is. Despite this difficulty an attempt needs to be 
made for the purposes of this paper, so as a starting point we could say that 
when we talk about ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI), we are referring to systems and 
objects that are designed to imitate human intelligence in some way, but without 
the biology. The term AI have several synonyms, such as deep learning, 
machine learning and neural networks (a sub-set of machine learning), but 
terminology notwithstanding these systems are generally built using algorithms; 
a set of clear instructions to be carried out by the machine, whence it learns 
from previous results and tries to predict future results based on that learning.65 
This type of intelligence includes the design of systems like artificial neural 
networks, i.e. machines designed to learn and make decisions autonomously, 
so-called as a result of their design based on the human nervous system, and 
one of its chief benefits is the ability to process huge amounts of data rapidly. 
 
Interesting and exciting questions have come to the fore regarding AI and 
intellectual property rights, such as whether or not an AI can be considered an 
                                                     
65 Tsang et al (2017), p 1 
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‘inventor’ and also issues regarding the inventive step and how the position of 
the ‘person skilled in the art’ might change when the invention in question 
comes from an AI, some of which have been at least briefly mentioned by the 
EPO in the summary of the Patenting Artificial Intelligence Conference from 
May 2018, wherein it is stated: “The skilled person was aware of concepts and 
terminology used in the field of the application and had the means for routine 
work and experimentation, which could include AI tools if their use was common 
in the filed in question.”66 This statement served to demonstrate the EPO’s 
belief that such a person skilled in the art would also have knowledge of the 
relevant AI in the field and use it as necessary to determine the existence of an 
inventive step. Of course, this is a very brief and introductory statement, but it 
at least indicates the acceptance of the use of AI in the course of an 




The exciting questions notwithstanding, for the present at least, the creation 
and development of artificial intelligence is ostensibly to serve as an aid to 
human intelligence across a variety of fields and has been shown to bring 
significant advances to medical research and treatment; the medical field has 
seen the level of interest and usage of AI rise substantially over the past three 
decades or so. As with other fields and industries interested in the use of AI, 
big data and machine learning are of particular interest to medicine, given the 
possibilities for improving medical research and patient care, for example by 
improving the field of diagnostics. Artificial neural networks, for instance, form 
a very significant part of the type of AI used in medicine, given their “ability to 
classify and recognise patterns accurately has attracted researchers to apply 
them in solving many clinical problems”.67 These types of networks can be used 
in processing images in radiology, for example, as well assisting physicians in 
diagnostics and dosage.68 The importance and potential of AI in medicine and 
healthcare is worthy of mention, since it shows great possibilities, for instance, 
                                                     
66 EPO (2018), Patenting Artificial Intelligence Conference Summary, p 5 
67 Ramesh et al. (2004), p 335 
68 Ibid 
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for improving data collection and processing; at present maybe one of its chief 
benefits is this ability to process huge amounts of data, since machine 
learning’s rapid processing of such data can improve areas like diagnostics and 
prognosis, as well as more mundane tasks, such a patient record filing. Such 
developments help increase accuracy in medicine, resulting in fewer errors, 
and also help to save medical practitioners and their staff from time-consuming 
tasks that detract from time spent on research or with their patients. Even the 
European Patent Office (EPO) has referred to AI as the 4th industrial revolution, 









2 The Categories of medical methods of treatment in depth 
     
 
The following chapter will analyse the three categories of methods of medical 
treatment in more detail, drawing on case law from the three jurisdictions in an 
effort to compare and contrast how these categories are understood and the 
legislation that as built around them through case law. By categories is meant 
the three fields of medical method invention, that is surgical, therapeutic and 
diagnostic, and not e.g. pharmaceuticals or medical devices. The three 
methods will be discussed in separate sections, with statute and case law from 
each jurisdiction interspersed through each. 
 
From a European perspective, this discussion will take shape in light of the 
decisions of the TBA (Technical Board of Appeal) in their dealings with the 
cases that have come before them. Some pertinent claims brought before the 
                                                     
69 EPO, December 2017 
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Board of Patent Appeals in the US and the Federal Court of Australia will 
hopefully serve to highlight some of the ways these categories are judged in 
terms of patent claims, with the intention being to display similarities and 
differences between the jurisdiction where they are expressly excluded in 




2.1 Surgical Methods of Treatment 
 
A surgical method of treatment concerns acts or interventions of a physical 
nature on a body that is either human or animal, usually with the intention of 
maintaining or improving the health thereof. Case law, however, has shown that 
the interpretation and conceptualisation of what is precisely meant by surgery 
and a method of treatment by surgery, and thus what is excluded and what can 
be patented. For instance, it is generally the case that if a surgical method has 
a more cosmetic purpose, such as hair removal, it is not excluded from 
patentability. Such methods are viewed as not having any curative purpose or 
genuine invasive step.70 Some cases have determined that the involvement of 
a professional and associated expertise in the procedure as well as having a 
step that amounts to a physical intervention of a substantial nature amounts to 
a method of treatment by surgery.71  
 
Article 53(c) of the EPC states that patents shall not be granted for: “methods 
for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery…”. It stands to reason 
that when attempting to delineate the extent and breadth of what is excluded, 
a solid definition of what constitutes a method of treatment by surgery would 
certainly be useful; as one would imagine such a definition is to be expected. A 
definition of surgery in the Guidelines for Examination is outlined at 4.2.1.1. with 
                                                     
70 EPO; Guidelines for Examination, Part G: Patentability, Chapter II: Inventions, section 4.2.1.1: 
Surgery 
71 Of course it should be noted that other surgical methods exist for treatment in a negative way, such 
as e.g. insect sterilisation (an example given by XXXX)  
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the case G 1/07 (MEDI-PHYSICS) being the sole case cited. Needless to say, 
the Guidelines are careful to state that each potential surgical treatment method 
patent claim must be assessed case by case, but that in general, a definition 
“of the term “treatment by surgery” must cover the kind of interventions which 
constitute the core of the medical profession’s activities”.72 Moreover, aside 
from the cosmetic treatments mentioned above, inventions that involve no 
significant health risk and wherein the intervention is minor shall not be included 
in the scope of 53(c). This is claimed in the Guidelines as a ‘narrower’ 
interpretation of the article, which nevertheless serves to protect the interests 
of those in the medical profession. The difficulty with this definition is thus 
determining, for example, just how narrow the “narrower understanding of the 
exclusion” is, for which we must turn to the case law of the TBA. 
 
If the definition, or the understanding there of, is overly broad, more exclusions 
from patentability would appear than would not be perhaps justifiable or 
perhaps contrary to the spirit of the provision. An overly narrow interpretation, 
however, could permit the patenting of treatments by surgery that the legislation 
was drafted to prevent. The legal question of a balance of interests must again 
be struck here; if the EPC excludes methods of treatments by surgery so as to 
ensure that veterinary surgeons and physicians are not unduly burdened by the 
existence of excessive patents in their field, the narrowness of the 
understanding must be still be such that creativity and development are 
possible.  
 
An interesting question is how these interpretations apply to the other methods, 
i.e. whether or not they are equal in their understanding, such that neither 
diagnostic methods that are practiced on the human or animal body nor 
therapeutic methods are afforded greater scope for patentability or restricted 
either through broader or narrower interpretations of the article. These kinds of 
                                                     
72 Ibid. 
 31 
questions and considerations that arise from the Guidelines mean that a 
consistent approach by the TBA would help to further clarify both the spirit 
behind the provision and the length and breadth of its interpretation. According 
to Eddy Ventose: “The TBAs have not been able to delineate the scope of the 
exclusion with any measure of consistency.”73  
 
The case of T 182/90 (SEE-SHELL/Blood flow) saw the TBA dissect the then 
article 52(4) into several pieces, in order to examine and define the meanings 
of the terms therein before deciding the scope of the exclusion.74 In so doing, 
the Board endeavoured to illustrate what is meant by the terms ‘treatment’, 
‘surgery’ and ‘treatment by surgery’, before determining the intent of the 
exclusion and making a judgment based on that conclusion. According to the 
Board in Blood flow, ‘treatment’ as a concept encompasses many possibilities, 
of which some can be patentable, since the term is apparently not restricted to 
methods which serve a strictly therapeutic function.75 This is intriguing, since if 
one reads the article 53(c) ‘as is’, the exclusion applies to treatment methods 
by surgery or therapy, which raises the question of the relationship between the 
three words. Are surgery and therapy mutually exclusive? But should all 
treatments not automatically serve a therapeutic purpose? The wording of the 
article suggests not, otherwise why explicitly prohibit treatment by therapy. The 
TBA, in the meantime, appear to have disagreed with this reading in the case 
of Blood flow, since they draw a distinction between types of treatment, since a 
medical method: “may also include treatments for other, non-curative purposes 
such as cosmetic treatment, the termination of pregnancy, castration, 
sterilisation, artificial insemination, embryo transplants…”76 The Board also 
disagreed with the Guidelines by (admittedly rather tentatively) disputing the 
statement that surgery should define the treatment’s nature rather than its 
purpose. 
                                                     
73 Ventose (2011), p 124. 
74 T 0182/90 (Blood flow) of 30.7.1993 




In the case of MEDI-PHYSICS,77 the belief that exclusions for treatments of a 
surgical nature could be limited to surgeries that took place for therapeutic 
purposes was not possible, since it was their view that surely it would already 
be excluded by default as a result of the exclusion of methods of treatment by 
therapy from patentability. It is from this case that treatment by surgery was 
given some more clarity by the EBA, owing to the TBA referring questions to 
the Enlarged Board. MEDI-PHYSICS concerned an imaging method, and it was 
denied patentability owing to the presence of an invasive step, which required 
the skill of a trained professional. Although the method itself was not precisely 
aimed at the maintenance of life or health, the EBA held that it was not 
necessary for a method of surgery to have a therapeutic purpose. This case is 




2.2 Therapeutic Methods of Treatment 
 
With regard to therapeutic methods of medical treatment, this section will 
consider and discuss this exclusion in terms of its core definitions and whether 
or not these have been consistently applied. Possible solutions to any such 
inconsistencies regarding methods of treatment (on humans or animals) found 
in the TBAs’ decisions will also be analysed. 
 
 
By way of introduction, a method of treatment by therapy is usually defined as 
a treatment that serves the purpose of either eliminating, relieving, curing, or 
reducing disease symptoms, or lessens/eliminates the chances of contracting 
disorders or diseases. From this we can determine that a therapeutic method 
is one that serves to provide relief for pain and discomfort. Cases have also 
shown that a treatment for prophylactic purposes (e.g. methods for preventing 
                                                     
77 G 01/07 (MEDI-PHYSICS) of 15.2.2010 
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potential illness or maintaining good health) are also methods of treatment by 
therapy. As such, in accordance with the decisions of the TBA and EBA (many 
of which for some reason seem to concern pigs), should a claim display even 
one step or feature that would constitute a method of treatment by therapy, it is 
excluded by default from patentability.   
  
In Europe, a narrow interpretation of the exclusion from patentability of methods 
of medical treatment is expected, which means that it does not include 
treatment methods that are not of a therapeutic nature. This means that the 
word ‘therapy’ is expected to be precisely defined, with that definition adhered 
to.  According to the TBA in the of SALMINEN/Pigs III, the word ‘therapy’ 
includes: “any non-surgical treatment which is designed to cure, alleviate, 
remove or lessen the symptom of, or prevent or reduce the possibility of 
contracting any malfunction in the human body”.78 The case concerned an 
invention to prevent the suffocation of piglets by blowing air whenever the sow 
stood up. In this instance the Board determined that the mere prevention of 
accidents could not constitute a therapeutic method: “the invention is 
concerned with prevention accidents, analogous to a method of preventing a 
worker from trapping his hand in machinery”.79 
 
Furthermore, the TBA goes on to state that a therapeutic method: “relates to 
the treatment of a disease in general or to a curative treatment in the narrow 
sense, as well as the alleviation of the symptoms of pain and suffering”.80 Thus 
the term ‘therapy’ was not intended to signify only diseases and their cures, but 
any particular treatment that is for curing, reducing or completely removing 
symptoms of illness in human or animals, as well as treatments developed to 
prevent the contraction of illnesses and their associated symptoms.  
                                                     
78 T 0058/87 of 24.11.1988 at 2.1 




It was also earlier in Pigs II that the TBA pondered methods of medical 
treatment by therapy that serve to maintain or restore the health of humans or 
animals and came to the conclusion that a method is not excluded if there is no 
direct effort to restore or maintain health, which renders the treatment 
unmedical and the exclusion does not apply. The Board determined that this 
was a prophylactic treatment and thus came within the scope of the word 
‘therapy’ in Art. 53(c). Therefore, if the purpose of the method is in any way 
preventative or curative, it will be excluded as a medical method. The case of 
Dysmenorrhoea from the same year drew some interesting conclusions when 
it determined that the treatment of pain, whether from a disease or from a 
normal functioning of the human body resulted in the treatment method being 
considered as a medical one: “Irrespective of the origin of pain, discomfort or 
incapacity, its relief, by the administration of an appropriate agent, is to be 
construed as “therapy” or “therapeutic use” in the sense of Article 52(4).”81 
 
According to the TBA, as stated in the case T 0592/98, the reasoning behind 
Article 52(4) in EPC 1973 was “to prevent any obstacle to the freedom to 
choose the best medical treatment to be applied to a patient and to avoid any 
delay in the application of such medical treatment”.82 It was the Board’s view 
that treatment patents would amount to stumbling blocks that could prevent 
swift treatment in a timely manner, thus infringing on the rights of the patient. 
The Board do not outline what would cause such delays, although it is to be 
presumed that if a treatment is patented, the e.g. physician seeking to use it in 
the course of patient treatment would need to seek permission first in order to 
do so, leading to a possible delay in providing it, which is not in the best interests 
of public health. 
 
                                                     
81 T 0081/84 
82 T 0592/98 of 5.10.2001, at Reasons for the Decision, 2. 
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Products and devices used in medical methods of treatment 
 
The second sentence to Article 53(c) EPC provides that the exclusion from 
patent protection of methods of medical treatment shall not apply to products, 
substances or compositions for use in any of the medical methods. It is self-
evident that the prohibition on patenting methods of medical treatments would 
not prevent the patentability of products, including substances or compositions, 
even if they are used in such excluded methods, since otherwise it would be 
difficult to medical products or devices in general. Where, however, a claim 
covers the actual use of a device in the treatment of a patient, it becomes 
necessary to determine whether or not that device is patentable, 
notwithstanding the exclusion of methods of treatment by therapy from patent 
protection. Arguably, the exclusion for methods of medical treatment begins to 
bite when the claim is for a device ‘when used’ in a method of medical treatment 
such as by therapy, surgery or of diagnosis. This means that while patent 
protection is available for medical devices, they cannot derive novelty from the 
way they are intended to be used in the excluded method of treatment. These 
claims are, therefore, not excluded from patent protection by virtue of Article 
53(c) EPC.  
 
Speaking of devices, if a device is used in treatment it can have a large bearing 
on whether or not the use of that device indicates if method is actually a method 
of medical treatment. In order to determine whether or not the method falls 
within the exclusion, the degree to which the device is used in its connection to 
an animal or human is examined, such that a very profound connection or 
functional link would render the device as an extension of the treatment, 
meaning it would fall within the exclusion. In the case of Flow measurement for 
instance, a flow rate measurement device measured liquid in small amounts 
passing through a tube, which in turn administered insulin using an implanted 
pump. The measurement method thus determined how well the pump was 
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working. It was the decision of the TBA that no functional link between the flow 
measurement and the insulin pump existed, since: “the fact that…a drug is also 
passing into the body generally with a therapeutic effect, is not sufficient on its 
own…to justify a finding that the flow timing is therapeutic.”83 It would seem that 
the Board’s decision is based on the idea that the measurement device itself 
did not have any influence on the insulin administration, thus it produced no 
therapeutic effect, i.e. the body was not affected in any way by the workings of 
the device.  
 
That said, implantable devices fall on both sides of the fence regarding 
patentability, for instance if a method to operate a pacer controls cardiac 
function, then it is a therapeutic method of treatment. The case of   
TELECTRONICS, in which a method to adjust a pacemaker’s rate for optimal 
performance while someone is exercising, the TBA were of the view that the 
functional link did exist in this instance, since the method had a therapeutic 
effect on the body by causing the pacemaker to adjust its rate. Thus the claim 




The above explanations regarding the definition of medical methods of 
treatment by therapy notwithstanding, there are still areas that could be further 
defined. Some questions that could arise include: issues including the human 
or animal body, such as if there are or should be differences in how the methods 
are considered with regard to whether they are performed on a human or an 
animal; if a cosmetic treatment has some therapeutic purpose can be eligible; 
                                                     
83 T 0245/87 (Flow measurement) of 25.9.1987, at 3.2.1 
84 T 0082/93 (Telectronics) of 15.05.1995 
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if there can be a clearer dividing line between devices used for therapy and 




2.3. Diagnostic Methods of Treatment 
 
Christina Gates describes diagnosis as: “the determination of the nature of a 
medical or veterinary medical condition intended to identify or uncover a 
pathology.”85 With regard to medical diagnostic methods, Article 53(c) EPC also 
excludes ‘diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body’ from 
patent protection. A method to obtain a diagnosis is a little different from other 
methods, since a diagnosis is not in and of itself a treatment, so to speak. 
Nevertheless, its exclusion is also evident in the ‘methods of medical treatment 
exclusion’ found in Article 53(c). With the increasing complexity and technical 
sophistication associated with medical treatments, and by extension diagnostic 
methods, in this technologically advanced age, the EPO view it as important 
that this exclusion in Article 53(c) EPC is not interpreted in a way that would 
serve to suffocate appropriate research and development in this vital and 
essential area.86 The new age of technological advancement in the medical 
field, using genetic testing and gene therapy, would not be sustainable if an 
appropriate balance is not struck when interpreting the exclusion.  
 
Arising from the case of CYGNUS/Diagnostic method, the EBA further defined 
what is meant by a diagnostic method for future reference in cases where 
exclusions from patentability should be applied regarding methods to be 
                                                     
85 Gates (2014) 
86 G 0001/04 (Diagnostic methods) of 16.12.2005, Reasons for the opinion, 4 
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practised on humans or animals. The Board determined that a diagnostic 
method includes 4 discrete steps: i) data gathering & examination; (ii) 
comparison of the data with more normal values; (iii) recording possible 
significant deviations; and (iv) showing that the deviation is part of a certain 
clinical picture.87 In order to be considered as a diagnostic method, and thus 
patent ineligible, the claim must display all four of the aforementioned steps. 
Moreover, for exclusion of that method to occur, there must be one technical 
step that is practised on the animal or human body.88 As a result of these steps 
from CYGNUS, it has perhaps become somewhat clearer for the Technical 
Boards to determine when a patent application should be accepted or rejected 
depending on whether or not a method can be established as being diagnostic 
in nature.  
 
The case of BRUKER/Non-invasive measurement meant that the TBA had to 
consider the scope of the exclusion of diagnostic methods from patent 
protection, and came to a number of important conclusions.89 The claim 
concerned local magnetic resonance for the non-invasive determination of 
chemical and/or physical conditions inside a living human or animal body. After 
examining the legislative history of the exclusion, the TBA concluded that the 
purpose of Article 52(4) EPC (in force at that time) was for the purpose of 
shielding doctors from unwanted legislative obstructions in the course of their 
practice, thus for similar reasons to the other methods of treatment discussed 
above. Since what constituted a ‘diagnostic method’ needed to be first 
delineated by the Board before proceeding further in their judgement, it was in 
this case that the definition of diagnostic methods in terms of patent exclusion 
was outlined as: “the only diagnostic methods to be excluded from patent 
protection are those whose results immediately make it possible to decide on a 
                                                     
87 By clinical picture is meant the overall picture of all the information that is relevant to a disorder or 
disease, or a patient’s state of health.  
88 G 0001/04, Conclusion, 4: “Article 52(¤) EPC does not require a specific type and intensity of 
interaction with the human or animal body; a preceding step of a technical nature thus satisfies the 
criterion “practised on the human or animal body.” 
89 T 0385/86 (Non-invasive measurement) of 25.9.1987  
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particular course of medical treatment.”90 A method that does not allow a 
physician to make a decision immediately, but rather requires further e.g. 
analysis and/or tests is not by itself a diagnostic method. Thus a method that 
gives interim results, i.e. further steps that would need to be taken in order to 
reach a conclusion regarding the course of treatment, would not be not 
considered a diagnostic method as per Article 52(4).  
 
Having considered the issues with regard to what is meant by diagnostic 
method, the Board proceeded to examine the case in terms of methods of 
diagnosis that are only carried out and are only capable of being carried out by 
a qualified doctor and whether such methods would be unpatentable, and finally 
to what extent does the phase ‘practised on the human or animal body’ apply 
and what are its limitations. Regarding the second question, the Board came to 
the conclusion that a diagnostic method is susceptible of industrial application 
if a technician can use it to the desired effect, even without any special medical 
knowledge or expertise.91 
 
The EPO, in its decisions regarding diagnostic methods in G 01/04 made some 
significant decisions. As mentioned above, the diagnostic method of treatment 
under examination must contain all four of the steps devised by the Board in 
order to be excluded. It was the Board’s  determination that the provision under 
article 53(c) should be construed narrowly, since the article does not refer to 
steps of any kind, or any other broader features, thus “in order to be excluded 
from patentability, the method is to include all the steps relating to it”.92 Thus if 
the data-gathering step or diagnosis step is omitted, the method is not a 
diagnostic one.  
 
 
                                                     
90 T 0385/86 (non-invasive measurement) of 25.9.1987, headnote 
91 Ibid, Reasons for the Decision, 3.5.2 
92 G 1/04: 349-50 
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As Sterckx and Cockbain phrased it with regard to the four steps: “the 
insistence on the inclusion of the (mental) act of diagnosis raised the problem 
of how such a step could be practiced on the patient’s body.”93 As an act of the 
mind, the deductive phase cannot of itself have a practical physical application 
to a body. This conundrum was answered in the Board’s decision regarding 
‘practised on the human body’, in that only the steps that had a technical nature 
needed to practiced on the body, or that the body at least be somewhere 
nearby. This may seem a little on the convenient side, but the Board supported 
their decision by stating that other steps may: “include method steps such as 
comparing data collected in the examination phase… These activities are 
predominantly of a non-technical nature and…are not normally practiced on the 
human or animal body.”94 Of course, a potential patentee might try to avoid the 
exclusion by omitting the technical steps from the claim, but would be in any 
event excluded from patentability owing to the mental act of diagnosis or 
deduction being just that, a mental act, such acts being patent ineligible under 
article 52(2) EPC: “schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts”. 
Thus, in order to become patent eligible, a method of this nature would need to 
display steps of a technical character not practiced on the body.  
 
 
Finally, the Board further clarified some other aspects regarding possible 
methods of diagnosis for instance with regard to steps performed in vitro in a 
laboratory, such methods would include DNA microarrays and are not practiced 
on the human body directly. These kinds of genetic diagnostic methods are 
thus not excluded, at least not in principle, since the steps are of a technical 
nature. “In respect of diagnostic methods it already follows that the various 
method steps of a technical nature relating to such a method are basically 
meant to be performed on the…body, suggesting an interaction with the latter, 
rather than in vitro.”95 
 
                                                     
93 Sterckx et al (2015), p 155 
94 G 1/04, Reasons for the opinion, 6.4.1 











The function of Part II is first to trace some of the history (chapter 3) of medical 
methods of treatment in terms of patentability in the three selected jurisdictions 
(Europe, USA & Australia), followed by a critical discussion of the commonly 




3 Tracing the history of patenting medical methods of treatment  
 
 
3.1 EUROPE (EPC) 
 
Of course, European-wide laws do not share the same extensive history with 
individual countries in terms of longevity (Australia and the USA will be 
discussed in the sections below), since the EPO (European Patent Office) was 
established by the EPC (European Patent Convention) in 1973. The purpose 
of its founding was to create a European body that would process the granting 
of patent claims, in the sense that while inventors could seek national patents 
as before, the option now existed to seek a patent directly from the EPO, which, 
if successful, could be granted in all states that form the EPC’s Members, of 
which there are 38 at the present time. As stated in Article 1 of the EPC: “A 
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system of law, common to the Contracting States, for the grant of patents for 
invention is hereby established.”96  
 
With regard to medical methods of treatment, the original provision precluding 
them from patentability was contained in EPC Article 52(4). Section 1 of the 
same Article states: “European patents shall be granted for any inventions 
which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve 
an inventive step.”97 Following on from this, Section 4 provides (Art. 54):  
 
“Methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body shall not be regarded as 
inventions which are susceptible of industrial application within the meaning of paragraph 
1. This provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or compositions, for 
use in any of these methods.”98 
 
Thus as can be seen, medical methods of treatment were denied patentability 
under the guise of lack of industrial application. The second sentence is 
presumably intended to clarify that this exemption does not stretch to materials 
etc used when performing a method. EPC 2000 entered into force in December 
2007, and with this new edition of the convention, Article 52(4) of the original 
convention was replaced by Article 53(c). Essentially, what is excluded in terms 
of content remained unaffected, all that was actually altered was the reasoning 
and legal justification warranting the exclusion of medical methods of treatment 
from patentability. In their explanatory comments, the EPC 2000 drafters 
indicated that the alteration would not more than likely not have any effect on 
the interpretation of the prohibition in practice when it came to judging the 
inventions brought before the EPO.99 Whereas hitherto the legal justification 
was based on the concept of a medical method as lacking any industrial 
                                                     
96 European Patent Convention, 1973, art. 1. The revised EPC 2000 (art. 1) states: “A system of law, 
common to the Contracting States, for the grant of patents for invention is established by this 
Convention.” 
97 EPC, 1973, Art. 52(1) 
98 EPC 1973, Art 52(4) 
99 ‘[a] change in the EPO’s current practice regarding these inventions is not envisaged’ as a 
result (The Basic Proposal for the Revision of the European Patent Convention, 13 October 
2000, Article 53 EPC, Explanatory Remarks, at para. 3). 
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application, this reasoning was rather conspicuously left absent from Article 
53(c). It seems therefore that while the justification was removed, the judicial 
approach under Article 53(c) would remain similar to that of Article 52(4). The 
exclusions under 53(c) and the changes in interpretation and justification will 






Exclusions from patentability under Article 53 EPC 
 
 
As mentioned above, a number of exclusions exist in European law, denying 
patentability to certain types of subject matter, the relevant provisions of which 
are contained in Article 53 EPC. Article 53(a) prohibits patents on inventions 
that would be contrary to the ordre public, i.e. subject matter that would run 
afoul of public opinion, owing to the sensitive nature of the content involved.100 
Article 53(b) excludes the patenting of varieties of plants or animals or the 
“essentially biological processes for the production or plants or animals”101, 
from which we can deduce that no process that occurs or can occur in nature 
should be patentable. From a European perspective, it is Article 53(c) of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) that is addresses the subject matter under 
discussion, since it prohibits patentability in respect of: “methods for treatment 
of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods 
practiced on the human or animal body”102, and moreover “this provision shall 
not apply to products, in particular substances or compositions, for use in any 
of these methods.”103 On the face of it, therefore, it appears that a medical 
method in itself may not seek a patent, but any products used in the course (at 
least, any newly invented ones) of that method might be patentable. A review 
                                                     
100 EPC, Art 53(a) 
101 EPC, Art 53(b) 
102 EPC, Art. 53(c) 
103 Ibid. 
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and discussion of the unpatentability of medical method will take place in the 






Article 53(c) EPC: exclusion of surgical, therapeutic and diagnostic 
methods 
 
The discussion here will examine medical methods as discussed above and 
how they are categorised in law, along with the EPO guidelines for medical 
methods and the limitations to these exclusions.  
 
 
The EPC was revised in 2000 and this exclusionary provision had hitherto 
formed part of Article 52 of EPC 1973.104 Its relocation to Article 53(c) was “so 
as to make it a stand-alone policy exclusion rather than an exclusion grounded 
in the requirement for susceptibility of industrial application.”105 This raises the 
question: why was this? If medical methods cannot have industrial application, 
why then was a separate provision deemed necessary to address this? 
According to the EPO, this fascinating change was a result of the recognition 
of the complete “legal fiction” that medical methods are not susceptible of 
industrial application.106 The correct reason, so to speak, given by the EPO for 
the existence of this exclusion is that such methods are excluded from 
patentability for reasons of public health. In the words of the 2000 proposal: “It 
is undesirable to uphold this fiction [lack of industrial application] since methods 
of treatment and diagnostic methods are excluded from patentability in the 
interests of public health.”107 It could be claimed that the wording of Article 52(4) 
of EPC 73 gives rise to the suggestion that the methods could in fact be 
                                                     
104 EPC 73, Art. 52(4) 
105 Pila et al. (2016), p 122 
106 EPO, 1.1. Amendments made to Article 53 EPC as part of the EPC 2000 revision, in Case Law of the 
Boards of Appeal  
107 MR/2/00, p 45 
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susceptible of industrial application, a view which is supported with a note from 
Case T 182/90, wherein the court stated that such methods cannot be granted 
patents because of the article 52(4): “irrespective of whether or not these 
methods are, in fact, susceptible of industrial application”108, which does 
suggest a certain frustration on the part of the court regarding the sweeping 
nature of the provision. In light of this change or update in reasoning regarding 
the unpatentability of these methods, the EPO has provided guidelines and 
opinions addressing the limitations of these exceptions, discussed here in 
section 3.3. 
 
Worthy of mention here is a little more historical context, specifically with regard 
to UK law. In Justine Pila’s article on invention requirements, she examines the 
course of the exclusionary provisions in the UK, starting with the Statute of 
Monopolies 1623. Patents were originally intended only for manufacturing, i.e. 
for what was referred to as the industrial arts, and further refined to mean the 
manufacturing arts, excluding such items as business plans.109 What is of 
significance is Pila’s assertion: “Equally uncertain…was the status of methods 
of medical treatment. While accepted as inherently unpatentable, the reason 
was unclear.”110 This suggests that medical treatments have traditionally been 
excluded from patentability for purposes ill-defined or even unknown. While 
further research into the history and development of this exclusion would 
undoubtedly be very intriguing, it remains outside the scope of the present 
discussion. 
 
That said, this type of context nevertheless serves as useful insight into how 
policy changes over time, i.e. the history of medical methods excluded because 
of lack of industrial art advancement or some other reason stands in quite stark 
contrast with the modern view of exclusions to protect physicians and others 
from claims of patent infringement. If it can be said that patentability exclusions 
for medical methods and treatments have been justified resulting (perhaps) 
from their not being part of the manufacturing arts, subsequently progressing 
                                                     
108 Case T 182/90, Blood Flow/See-Shell, point 2.1. in supra note 10, 88 
109 Pila, in Arezzo et al (2011), p 65 
110 Ibid. 
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to the so-called fiction regarding their lack of industrial applicability and 
currently to their lack of admissibility owing to concerns for public health, it is 
interesting to consider future directions such a policy might take, especially in 
light of advances in medical methods in recent decades.  
 
 
EPO Guidelines and opinions regarding exclusions of surgical, 




In the original drafts of the EPC, there was no mention of methods of treatment 
by surgery, and this exclusion was not expanded to include them until 1969, 
with the broadening of the exclusion to surgical methods. THe next two years 
saw the wording change to ‘methods for treatment of the human [or animal] 
body by surgery’, an alteration that seemed to serve no other purpose than the 
cosmetic.  
 
The limitations to exclusions in Article 53(c) appear drafted so as to support 
and define the decidedly vague and brief explanation of “the interests of public 
health” in the EPC revision of 2000. The fundamental reasoning behind the 
exclusions concern methods that involve acts upon a human or animal, i.e. “to 
be excluded from patentability, a treatment or diagnostic method must actually 
be carried out on the living human or animal body”.111 Methods performed on 
the dead ones, by contrast, do no fall within the remit of Article 53(c). The 
parameters are then further defined, for example: should fluid or tissue be 
removed from living creatures, any suitably inventive method or treatment 
carried out on those samples is potentially patentable, provided their 
subsequent return to the subject does not feature in the process.112  
 
   
                                                     




In the original drafts of the EPC, there was no mention of methods of treatment 
by surgery, and this exclusion was not expanded to include them until 1969. 
For surgical treatments and methods, the EPO advise that exclusions from 
patentability be assessed case by case, with one of the overarching criteria for 
exclusion arising from particularly invasive forms of surgery, wherein there is a 
significant risk to the patient, whereas smaller operations on non-critical body 
parts e.g. tattooing and piercing are not excluded from patentability. One 
argument for excluding surgical methods is that many methods of operating are 
decidedly similar and require specific knowledge and education on the part of 
the surgeon, meaning that patents are not possible given a method’s potential 
widespread use. It was the Re Medi-Physics case that served to illuminate the 
Board of Appeal’s efforts to achieve this more middle-of-the-road approach to 
these exclusions. This case concerned a method that included the injection of 
what is known as a contrast agent into a patient’s heart as part of a MRI 
(magnetic resonance imaging) process. It was the view of the court that this 
method could not be eligible for patentability as it fell under the definition of 
treatment by surgery and was thus excluded under Article 53(c). 113 Thus the 
Board did not hold the view that treatment by surgery needed to be therapeutic 
in nature, but could include other types of body treatment. Furthermore, at 58 
in the same case the Board believed the exclusion too restrictive owing to the 
advancement in various cosmetic procedures, such as piercing and tattooing, 
since they are non-invasive and not technically medical, even though they can 
be considered in a surgical light.114 Notably, the Board recognised the ever-
changing nature of technology and thus refused to give any all-encompassing 
definition of ‘treatment by surgery’,115 perhaps showing a certain amount of 
foresight into the rapid development of technology in the medical field.  
 
 
By therapy is generally meant methods for curing or preventing illness and 
disease in humans or animals, defined in T24/91 as “any treatment which is 
                                                     
113 G 001/07 (Treatment by surgery/MEDI-PHYSICS), 2010 
114 Ibid, 58 
115 Ibid, 63 
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designed to cure, alleviate, remove or lessen the symptoms of, or prevent or 
reduce the possibility of contracting any disorder or malfunction of the animal 
body’.116 As with surgical methods, certain cosmetic treatments that can 
considered to have a therapeutic effect are not excluded under article 53(c). 
Regarding an apparatus used in therapy, in order to determine that apparatus’s 
validity for a patent, it must be shown that a functional link does not exist 
between the steps involved in the method and the effect on the body. This might 
appear somewhat confusing, but the case included in the Limitations provides 
a useful distinction, namely the Flow Measurement case T 245/87, which 
concerned a monitoring system for a device for drug administration.  It was the 
view of the Court that because the apparatus was concerned only with 
measuring the function of the drug delivery device, the steps were purely 
technical and had no link to the therapeutic effects of the device itself.117 
 
 
In assessing patent exclusions for diagnostics methods, the EPO have devised 
a four-step system to determine a lack of patentability, namely i) examination, 
ii) comparison of data gathered, iii) the finding of any significant deviation, and 
iv) the deduction or decision phase.118 These aforementioned steps should be 
carried out on a living body, the standard rule for which is that a body must be 
present for the steps, regardless of the level of interaction with the medical 
practitioner. These steps aim to match the standard diagnostic process, and all 
of these steps must be met for exclusion. One rule of thumb could be that if the 
method steps are sufficiently technical and do not of themselves form a 





                                                     
116 T 24/91 Thompson/Cornea [1996] EPO 19 
117 T 0245/87 (Flow measurement) of 25.9.1987, 3.1 
118 EPO, Guidelines for Examination, 4.2.1.3: Diagnostic methods. See also G 1/04 Diagnostic methods 
(16.12.2005), at 5. 
 49 
Crucially, an explanation is given for the intent behind Article 53(c), which 
reveals an insight into the EPO’s mindset regarding the reason for this article’s 
existence, or at the very least, their reason: “it must be borne in mind that the 
intention of art. 53(c) is only to free from restraint non-commercial and non-
industrial activities.”119 As mentioned above, this statement has clearly been 
viewed as too broad by the Courts in cases such as Re Medi-Physics and was 
revised to include only invasive and/or risky methods or treatments. The EPO 
guideline nevertheless naturally suggests that e.g. physicians and medical 
practitioners going about their work of treating, diagnosing, or operating on live 
subjects will not need to fear potential claims for patent infringement when they 
are endeavouring to execute the ordinary business of their profession. This is 
evidently in line with public health policy, since any medical practitioner afraid 
to do their job as effectively as possible as a result of possible threats of 
litigation is certainly not in the public interest. What is notable in the EPO’s 
explanation, however, is the use of the terms “non-commercial and non-
industrial”. Is it to be inferred that potential commercial or industrial methods or 
treatments are in fact capable of patentability, even if they involve acts on living 
subjects? The answer to that question is, needless to say: it depends, for 
example if, as in the Eisai case G 0005/83, a second medical indication is found 
for “specified new and inventive therapeutic application”120 then a patent claim 





How strict is the exclusion under 53(c)?  
 
It is interesting to examine some of the challenges brought to the Board by 
parties opposed to the patent in question. As mentioned above, article 53(a) of 
the EPC excludes patentability on the grounds of the invention being contrary 
to morality or pubic order, for instance if an invention was so repugnant to 
                                                     
119 EPO, Guidelines for Examination, 4.2.1: Limitations of exception under Art. 53(c) 
120 G 0005/83 (Second medical indication) of 5.12.1984, p 14 
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society, as was contested in the Relaxin case, which involved the codifying of 
the female pregnancy hormone of the same name, i.e. the inventors wished to 
patent human genetic material,121 the objections were all overturned by the 
board. The objections included various concerns, the most of dramatic of which 
was perhaps that patenting human genes "amounts to a form of modern slavery 
since it involves the dismemberment of women and their piecemeal sale to 
commercial enterprises”. Aside from these more outlandish challenges, other 
concerns included the lack of inventive step and the lack of novelty. 
 
In the case of Mutation/University of Utah, (which was the second of three 
cases), the defendants had created a method for diagnosing possible 
predispositions to mammary gland and ovarian cancer, which the appellants 
argued should not have been eligible for patenting under article 53(a), owing to 
it giving rise to ethical issues, and also under article 53(c), since in their view it 
constituted a method for diagnosis of the human body. The Technical Board, 
however, held that the exclusion only applies (as per the decision in G 01/04) 
to methods practised on the human or animal body, and since the method is 
question is performed on a tissue sample, the appeal on that count must fail.  
 
 
Regarding the potential socio-economic and ethical consequences that might 
occur (e.g. that patients would become dependent on the patent holder, and 
this would not be in line with human dignity), the Board followed the decision in 
T 1213/05, that the appeal was against the possible exploitation of the patent 
and not of the invention, meaning that the objection did not fall within article 
53(a).122 This is an interesting decision, since the Board (entirely legitimately) 
discounted the objection on a point of law. However, the appellants’ concerns 
with the ordre public being threatened through the patent exploitation were 
dismissed by the Board as merely being part of the “exclusionary nature of the 
rights granted by a patent…[S]uch an objection applies to the exploitation of 
any patent.”123 This is certainly an intriguing viewpoint for the Board to take on 
                                                     
121 T 0272/95 (Relaxin/HOWARD FLOREY INSTITUTE), see also EPO Official Journal, 1995, 388 
122 T 1213/05 (Breast and ovarian cancer/UNIVERSITY OF UTAH) of 27.9.2007, 53. 
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considerations regarding the ordre public, since it appears quite dismissive in 
terms of concerns regarding ethical considerations. The Board came to this 
opinion because of their belief that the objection, when ‘reduced to its essence’, 
amounted to the type of exploitation that could occur from any patent. Yet by 
only examining the essence of patent process and possible unfortunate 
outcomes resulting therefrom, does this not undermine the consideration of 









Patent law in the USA grew from the U.S. Constitution, since the constitutional 
mandate was to encourage “the progress of science and the useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writing sand discoveries.”124 The Patent Act (35 U.S. Code) 
regulates patenting the USA and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) was established under that code, to which prospective 
inventors must apply. According to the Patent Act §101: “Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”125 The word 
‘process’ is defined in §100(b) as “process, art or method, and includes a new 
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In terms of the present discussion, the patenting of medical methods of 
treatment is not prohibited under US patent law. That said, the issue has been 
in a state of uncertainty, and the fluctuations in case law over the past century 
have shown that medical methods have had a chequered reception regarding 
their patentability and the patents were infrequently granted until more recently. 
In fact, it was originally decided between the patent office and the medical 
profession that medical methods should be excluded from patentability, with 
the original medical Code of Ethics stating that for a doctor to hold a patent 
would be “derogatory to professional character”.127 The courts and the medical 
profession appeared to remain in agreement over this matter until 1954, when 
a landmark case, Ex Parte Scherer128 overturned a decision in the earlier case 
of Brinkerhoff,129 by permitting a claim to a patent for the use of a pressure jet 
to inject fluids into the body.130 It wasn’t perhaps until the case of Diamond v 
Chakrabarty131 in 1980, which permitted a biotechnology patent, that the idea 
of patenting medical methods really began to take hold.  
 
 
Thus patents for medical methods were rare, and did not begin to surface until 
the 1990s.132 For instance, It would appear that the first instance that (famously) 
came to light in the US concerning medical method infringement was the case 
of Pallin v Singer in 1993.133 The case centred on a claim by Dr Samuel Pallin 
that another doctor, Dr Jack Singer had infringed on a patented method for 
cataract surgery created (or at least patented) by Dr Pallin. The claimant 
alleged that the defendant performed the procedure more than 200 times in a 
year, as well as teaching the method to students. No license fees or royalties 
had been paid to Dr Pallin. The defendant claimed that he had been using the 
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cataract surgery method some time before Dr Pallin had filed for a patent, a 
claim that was supported by the testimony of the defence, as well as through 
the cross-examination of the claimant. The claimant lost the case, since the 
presiding judge, Judge Session, declared that the patent claims were invalid. 
Had the claim succeeded, Dr Pallin would have received a considerable income 
from royalty fees, given that approximately one million cataract removal 
surgeries are performed each year.134 The controversy caused by this case led 
to the amendment of the patent code through the addition of § 287 to 35 U.S.C.: 
“With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that 
constitutes an infringement under § 271…the provisions of §§ 281, 283, and 
285 of this title shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a 
related health care entity with respect to such medical activity.”135 This frankly 
astonishing addition to the patent code was created in the interests of bringing 
tranquillity back to the medical realm, but rather than expressly prohibiting the 
right to patent a medical method of treatment, Congress instead chose to permit 
such methods, but render them utterly toothless. This issue will be discussed 
further later in the paper.   
 
 
The decision in Pallin does not seem to have seriously affected the patenting 
of medical methods or litigation with regard to them, however, since in more 
current times, quite a significant number of cases have come before the US 
courts regarding methods of medical treatment. the Mayo v Prometheus136 
case created much criticism surrounding patents for medical methods of 
treatment, since once again, as in earlier cases, it was the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that such a method should not be patentable. The controversy arose from 
critics declaring that such a ruling would have the effect of bringing chaos to 
the patenting world, especially since it would appear that the method in Mayo 
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would easily satisfy §101 of the 35 U.S.C.137 The case a patented method that 
involved diagnostic kits for determining how well a patient could metabolise a 
medicine for gastrointestinal disorders. When Prometheus sued Mayo for 
producing and selling its own diagnostic kits, the Supreme court dismissed the 
rulings of the lower courts (apart from the District Court, which had come to the 
same conclusion) and held that the patents were ineligible, since they were 
based on a natural law and “the claimed processes are not patentable unless 
they have additional features…Doctors had been using these drugs for this 
purpose long before these patents existed.”138 
 
This controversial Supreme Court decision aside, in the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (CAFC), there has generally been a more or less consistent 
policy regarding methods of treatment, in that it is not merely, for instance, a 
‘mental process’ that would eliminate a method from patentability. It has usually 
been decided by the CAFC that a medical method of treatment can be capable 
of receiving a patent, whether or not a diagnostic step is involved.  
 
 
In the case of Classen Immunotherapies Inc,139, which is something of a 
landmark case, the CAFC determined whether or not a method for 
immunisation would be eligible for a patent. The facts of the case concerned 
immunising patients in accordance with two different immunisation timetables 
and observing which timetable had the lesser risk in terms of side effects, after 
which a patient would be immunised in accordance with the safer timetable. 
The act of deciding the safer schedule was not deemed patentable in and of 
itself, but the immunisation of a patient as a result of that decision was capable 
of receiving a patent. In other words, the decision was unanimous that 
immunizing two subject groups and comparing the results to determine the 
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most appropriate schedule for further immunisations, while not applying that 
same schedule to a specific individual, was not patent eligible. The added step 
of providing a subject with immunisations as per the decided schedule, 
however, caused the panel majority to allow patent eligibility for the 
method. While the majority of the court allowed that  - despite the presence of 
mental steps - a method of medical treatment is eligible for patenting, a 
dissenting judge thought the claims were “a monopoly over the scientific 
method itself.”140 It was Judge Moore’s view that the claims principles were 
‘basic and abstract’, to the extent that they should be rendered unpatentable.  
 
 
Methods of diagnosis 
This positive ruling continued in later cases, including Endo Pharmaceuticals 
Inc141 and National Alternatives International Inc.142 However, if a claim for a 
patent does not involve a medical method of treatment, and only has diagnostic 
steps or elements, the CAFC has routinely declared such claims ineligible, for 
instance in PerkinElmer Inc v Intema Ltd143 and Cleveland Clinic Foundation v 
True Health Diagnostics LLC.144 Some further examples are also evident where 
applications for patents for diagnostic methods of treatment were struck down 
by the Federal Circuit, including Myriad (by the Federal Circuit, before it went 
to the Supreme Court, Roche Molecular Systems, Inc v Cepheid,145 and Ariosa 
Diagnostics, Inc v. Sequenom, Inc.146 The facts are of course different in each 
of these, but in each one the method’s result is diagnosis, not in the actual 
treatment of patients. Some of these cases will be discussed below.  
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The case of National Alternatives International Inc concerned a patent 
infringement claim with regard to a method for the increase of anaerobic 
performance and capacity in humans through the administration of an amino 
acid selected from a group of three. The defendant was of the opinion that the 
patent was ineligible owing to it being the simple recognition of a natural 
principle, since it known which amino acids improve anaerobic ability. At first 
instance this defence was accepted and the patents were invalidated, but on 
appeal in the Federal Circuit, this ruling was overturned.  It was their view that  
rather than being natural phenomena on which the claimant was attempting to 
capitalize, the claims were “an application of the law and new use of that 
product…[T]he use of the supplement to achieve a given result is not directed 
to a law of nature.”147 It would be difficult, in the Court’s view, to ban medical 
treatment that is based on natural principles without banning a great many other 
methods of treatment.  
 
The case of Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc was an infringement case concerning a 
pain treatment method for patients with renal problems. The patent itself 
involved the release of oxycodone (a pain-relief medication) in a controlled 
fashion in line with the measurements of creatine clearance in the patient, after 
which another lower dose would be given, a situation that would continue until 
the medicine dropped below a certain administration rate. This meant that the 
dosage rate of the painkiller was correlated with the patient’s rate of creatine 
clearance, such that excessive dosages would be avoided, and the amount of 
the medicine administered would be tailored to the individual patient. This is a 
kind of personalized medicine, which has given rise to and may yet give rise to 
many new methods of medical treatment, since finding ways to prevent illness 
and treat patients according to their specific physiology and e.g. molecular 
profiling and lifestyle information, has been increasing in recent years.148 As in 
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National Alternatives International, Inc, the court at first instance upheld the 
view that the patent was based on a mere law of nature, thus ineligible for 
patenting. Once again, the Federal Circuit chose to overturn this decision, 
stating that the method used a natural law in its application, but the method as 




A decision taken in the case of INO Therapeutics v Praxair Distribution, 
however, seems to signify a change in course.149 This ruling therein could 
perhaps have significant ramifications for patenting medical methods in the US, 
if this decision is followed in future cases.  
 
In INO, the invention involved the treatment of new-borns with hypoxia using 
nitric oxide. A possibly fatal side effect of this treatment is pulmonary edema, 
and the invention in this case established that if a new-born’s left ventricle was 
not functioning normally, the risk of edema was greatly increased when nitric 
oxide was used as a treatment. Thus, the inventors were seeking a patent for 
a method of diagnosis using echocardiography to determine the presence of 
left ventricular dysfunction in a new-born with hypoxia.  
 
As with e.g. Classen (discussed above) and the other similar cases, the patent 
in this case concerned a diagnostic step, the result of which led to a medical 
intervention. However, unlike the ruling in Classen, the court in INO ruled that 
the treatment methods were already known and that the left ventricular 
dysfunction diagnosis did not contribute significantly more in terms of how we 
perceive natural law. It seemed the majority of the court interpreted the 
invention in INO as having one distinctive difference to the earlier cases of e.g. 
Classen and Endo, since the diagnostic step in INO only determined whether 
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treatment should be given or not, while the earlier inventions led to a definite 
administration of medical treatment, with the diagnostic step merely informing 
the level or form of the treatment. The reasoning of the court regarding why this 
invention was ineligible, as with cases like Mayo, included the determination 
that nitric oxide as a treatment was not new in any way, thus, “the patented 
method does not propose a new way of treating LVD patients.”150 Although the 
patentee argued that the claim in its entirety was new, the majority dismissed 
this approach, and declared “the focus of the invention is screening for a 
particular adverse condition that, once identified, requires iNO treatment be 
withheld.”151 
 
This is a clear difference with cases like Endo, since in that case the diagnostic 
step/test helped determine the correct dosage for the given treatment, rather 
than no treatment at all, as is sometimes the case with the INO method. It 
seems clear from this that the court believes an actual treatment should take 
place, rather than the withholding of one, in order to qualify as a medical method 
of treatment. That is, treatment in e.g. Endo, will occur in any event, which is 
not the case with INO. 
 
From this, we can interpret the court’s decision as being based on two factors, 
firstly that if the new-born does not suffer from left ventricular dysfunction, then 
the treatment cannot be included, since that form of treatment (nitric oxide in 
new-borns) is already known and in use. Secondly, if the new-born does in fact 
have left ventricular dysfunction, then it is very difficult to view the non-
administration of nitric oxide as a treatment, since the very premise is not to 
provide that treatment at all. The court pointed out that by not treating a patient, 
it amounts to the same result as allowing the body’s natural processes to take 
place: “the claim simply requires that the patient not be treated with INO.  This 
is significant because a claim not to treat…risks monopolizing the natural 
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processes themselves.”152 The method in question is thus a law of nature and 
an instruction on how to follow it, at least in terms of the effect of nitric oxide on 
new-born infants.  
 
It should be noted that the court was not in unanimous agreement, with Judge 
Newman dissenting. The judge disagreed with the notion of the invention as an 
application of a law of nature, since “it was designed by and is administered by 
humans”153, and also stated that how physiology reacts to a human/medical 
intervention is how all medical treatments are created. It is also true (as Judge 
Newman also pointed out) that dividing patent claims into smaller pieces and 
considering only some of those parts in a patent claim case has been strongly 
discouraged by the Supreme Court. It was the Judge’s opinion that to declare 
the INO claim ineligible was not in keeping with the previous rulings of the 
Supreme Court and the CAFC. 
 
 
The current status of medical treatment patents in the US 
 
 
At the present time, a case of some significance to the discussion here is under 
consideration by the Supreme Court, regarding whether or not to rule on it. 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,154 is another case that concerns treatment 
through diagnosis to provide personalized medicine (the concept was briefly 
outlined above in Endo Pharmaceuticals) and concerns a genetic test for 
patients with schizophrenia in order to establish the patient’s tolerance for a 
medicine called iloperidone. This genetic test could determine how well the 
patient could metabolise the medicine, since a low metabolic ability would 
increase risks of cardiac issues and complications. If such a genetic risk was 
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present in the patient, the dose of iloperidone would be below 12mg, thus vastly 
reducing the possibility of negative side effects. If absent, the dosage is set 
between 12 and 24mg per day.  
 
It was the view of the Federal Circuit that this method is patent eligible, and 
compared it to the ruling in Mayo, wherein a patent was denied since the court 
believed it only followed a law of nature and tried to optimize treatments 
according to those observations. In Hikma, however, the court held that the 
difference lay in the fact that the method contained the step of administering 
the medicine based upon the genetic knowledge with the intent of altering the 
patient’s condition. Hikma (and West-Ward pharmaceuticals International 
Limited, a subsidiary of Hikma) sought to file a petition for a writ of certiorari (a 
judicial review) with the Supreme Court, asking the Court to invalidate the 
patent on the grounds that it is merely a diagnostic method based on a natural 
law, since “patentees may circumvent § 101 by merely adding a simple 
treatment step that follows from the diagnosis.”155 The petition was denied in 
January 2020, with the Supreme Court permitting the Federal Court decision to 
stand.156  
 
Thus, at the present time, the status of medical diagnostic methods of treatment 
in the US is somewhat uncertain. The refusal by the Supreme Court to accept 
the petition for certiorari can be viewed as somewhat unfortunate, since it would 
have presented a useful opportunity to address the alleged inconsistencies in 
the rulings between Mayo and Hikma.157  Had the Supreme Court agreed to 
address the decision, it is entirely possible that personalized medicine and 
diagnostic method patents would be in some danger of becoming patent 
ineligible. It is certainly true that the issue has quite persuasive arguments on 
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each side. For instance, if a method of medical treatment that does not contain 
any diagnostic step is patent eligible, why should it be so that the addition of 
such a step would render it ineligible? On the other hand, it could be argued 
that medical diagnostic methods are of little use with no actual treatment, thus 
the addition of a treatment step to a diagnostic method (a method banned from 
patent eligibility in Mayo) to foster an eligible patent claim is questionable. What 
does this indicate for the future of medial methods of treatment in the US? As 
mentioned above, the current state of affairs is that while such patents are 
permitted, the possibility to seek remedies for infringement is prohibited, 
meaning that such patents are for the most part unenforceable.158 In light of 
this, it could be possible that the banning of medical diagnostic methods will be 
extended to other methods at some point, although the decision by the 
Supreme Court not to allow the Hikma petition suggests that for the time being 
the current position of the courts in holding that such methods are not merely 









In Australia, there is now no express law prohibiting the patenting of medical 
methods of treatment. This is especially interesting given Australia’s place in 
the Commonwealth, since originally Australia was bound by the Statute of 
Monopolies of 1623 (Section IV of which is quoted below), and as such would 
have followed UK precedent in patent matters, even though the UK laws 
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contained no express prohibition until considerably later (Patents Act 1977159). 
In the UK160, it was a case from 1914 that truly created a precedent for medical 
methods’ non-patentability. The judge ruled that the patent sought was merely 
for a method of treatment, and had no element of manufacture, and thus it 
followed in common law England and Wales that the absence of manufacture 
precluded a medical method of treatment from patentability (this case is 
discussed further below).161 Australia, however, gradually proceeded to 
acknowledge the right to patentability through case law. Patents for medical 
methods of treatment became eligible for patents in 1972. 
 
As with patent law in England prior to the Patents Act of 1977, there is no 
prohibition in Australian law with regard to the patenting of methods of medical 
treatment, with the issue thus being left to the courts’ determination. That said, 
at first there was some opposition to these methods of medical treatment being 
granted patents by either the Patent Court or the Australian courts, yet that time 
was short-lived, with both courts now generally appearing to support the 
patenting of these kinds of methods. Interestingly, the original preclusion of 
medical methods had little or nothing to do with ethics.  
 
 Before 1972 the patentability of methods of medical treatment was viewed by 
Australian courts as being a matter of what constitutes an ‘invention’, rather 
than a moral issue. The issue was reimagined after 1971 in moral terms and it 
is likely that there were several reasons for this, such as the idea that it might 
be permitted to grant patents for treatments that could have an impact on 
patients’ lives, and perhaps an growing interest in natural sciences and 
morality, which would naturally impact how patenting in such areas would be 
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perceived. On the other hand, whether or not methods of medical treatment 
could be viewed as patentable has perhaps always had a pivotal position from 
the perspective of ethics and public interest with regard to patenting, since the 
concept of an invention and its applicability to a clearly moral or ethical issue is 




Justine Pila speaks of inherent patentability and states: “Inherent patentability 
under Australian law depends on the existence of an inherently patentable 
subject matter or, as such subject matter has traditionally been denoted, on the 
existence of an ‘invention’ within the meaning of contemporary patents 
legislation.”162 The Patents Act 1990 defines the term invention in Schedule 1, 
and the definition has not altered in any substantial fashion from the original 
patent legislation. Schedule 1 states that an invention: “means any manner of 
new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within 
section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and includes an alleged invention”. If we 
look at Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623 (Eng) (‘Statute of 
Monopolies’) it states the following: 
 
“Provided also, and be it declared and enacted, that any declaration, 
before-mentioned, shall not extend to any letters patents (b) and grants of privilege 
for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working 
or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm (c) to the true and 
first inventor (d) and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of 
making such letters patents and grants shall not use (e), so as also they be not 
contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state by raising prices of commodities 
at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient (f): the same fourteen years to 
be accounted from the date of the first letters patents or grant of such privilege 
hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should be if 
this act had never been made, and of none other (g).” 163 
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It can therefore be seen that an invention in Australian law can encompass 
anything, once it is not unlawful, or mischievous, or ‘generally inconvenient’. 
This last phrase is quite interesting, since the law itself does not make further 
comment regarding what is generally inconvenient and what the possible tests 
could be in establishing an invention’s general inconvenience.  
 
As we saw in the development of patent law in the USA, the granting of patents 
for ‘any manner of manufacture’ began to be defined in case law, with 
exclusions appearing for claims that were enabling a natural process in some 
way, or the claims were too abstract. The case of Re Cooper’s Application164 
was the first case to depart from the UK norm of “any practical manifestation of 
an idea regardless of physical form”,165 since in the original case Mr Cooper 
was denied a patent for a new manner of folding newspapers (leaving blank 
spaces along the fold line, so the text would not be affected), since, according 
to the Comptroller in that case: “A Patent may be properly refused in any case 
in which no material product of a substantial character is realised or effected by 
the alleged invention, or in which the only material product is a printed sheet, 
or its equivalent, and the only alleged invention in an arrangement of words, or 
the like, upon such sheet.”166 The patent was granted on appeal, since it was 
determined that the invention was sound, owing to it being “a particular way of 
manufacturing a newspaper, and the alleged utility of his supposed invention is 
purely mechanical”,167 but what is interesting is how the Attorney-General 
agreed with the first part of the Comptroller’s argument by saying “The subject 
with reference to which you must apply for a Patent must be one which results 
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in a material product of some substantial character.”168 This stipulation clearly 
departs from the UK concept of any combination of ideas that were new and 






Methods of Medical Treatment in Australia 
 
 
It was in 1914 that the first case of a medical method being rejected for a patent 
came to light in Australia. C & W’s Application169for patent involved a process 
wherein lead could be removed from the body. It was decided that this invention 
was lacking in commerciality as a product and so could not be an invention 
under patent legislation. The Solicitor General relied on s 6 of the Statue of 
Monopolies in determining his judgment, particularly the ‘manner of new 
manufacture’ using the exclusions therein (“‘contrary to the law, or mischievous 
to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or 
generally inconvenient’) – and declared an invention to be “a machine or a 
process that can be used in making something that is, or may be, of commercial 
value”.170 It was also considered whether or not a human or animal body could 
be something improvable by a method such as the one in the case, but it was 
the Solicitor-General’s determination that this had no relevance to manufacture 
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or trade. As a result, methods of medical treatment would be excluded from 
patentability as a general rule, which the Solicitor-General found acceptable.  
 
 
In terms of legal justification, the decision in C & W’s Application is an intriguing 
one. Declaring that the method had no relevance to trade seems unlikely, since, 
regardless of whether the method was medical one or not, such a method (if 
patented) could be licensed and subject to royalties, especially given that lead 
poisoning at the time was still quite common. As justifications go, this one 
seems unconvincing, since decided that such a method would have no 
commercial applicability is more than likely untrue. If this reasoning was thus 
used as means to exclude medial methods of treatment, the justification for this 
decision remains cloudy, since it is not at all clear how these methods are not 
relevant to manufacture or trade. When reading through the judgment, it is 
perhaps possible to infer that the Solicitor-General might have been 
uncomfortable with the idea of the commercialization of the human body, or 
perhaps also that the seeking of patents by doctors would somehow be contrary 
to the morality of their profession. That said, the Solicitor-General stated that 
morality was not a factor in considering the judgement by saying: 
 
“It has been urged, and I think quite rightly, that the question of humanity ought 
not to affect the decision in such a case as this ... Of course, it is well known 
that the medical profession do all in their power to discourage members of their 
body from obtaining protection for any discovery that has for its object the 
alleviation of human suffering, and it is impossible to speak too highly of such 
conduct, but it cannot affect my judgment in arriving at a conclusion upon the 
terms of the Section of the Act of Parliament, and I have altogether excluded 
such consideration from my mind.”171 
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While this is a ringing statement denying any moral element in his decision-
making, the fact remains that the justifications given for the exclusion are not 
entirely plausible in persuading a reader to accept his point of view. The fact 
remains that the Solicitor-General would have been aware of the provision in 
the UK Patents and Designs Act of 1907, which permitted the judiciary to ‘refuse 
to grant a patent for an invention ... of which the use would, in his opinion, be 
contrary to law or morality’.172 It is also true that the inclusion of a claim as being 
generally inconvenient in patent law as grounds for ineligibility would 
theoretically be a very broad brush for the courts to use in excluding an 
invention from patentability owing to it being contrary to a public policy.  
 
As a result, the decision in C & W’s Application can be considered a rather 
disappointing one, since it failed to address in any open way the public order 
issues at hand, such as that of morality in allowing doctors to have monopolies 
over their methods. This means that the idea that medical methods of treatment 
lacking a commercial product requirement was the overarching result of the 
case. The lack of inclusion of a discussion surrounding public policy concerns, 
as well as the failure to declare that there is no commercially justifiable reason 
to exclude medical methods from patentability left a lasting mark on patent law 
in Australia, with the effects being evident in subsequent cases of a similar 
nature.  
 
The case of Joos v The Commissioner of Patents (1972) was another landmark 
case in the Australian courts regarding patenting medical methods of treatment. 
It involved a cosmetic treatment to improve the strength and elasticity of hair in 
an effort to prevent hair thinning and baldness. It was ruled that cosmetic 
methods of treatment were inherently patentable because they would have 
commercial viability and significance.173 This certainly – at least on the surface 
– appears to be an opener into permitting patents for medical treatments, and 
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the judge went onto define methods as being: “for medical treatment of human 
disease, malfunction, disability or incapacity of the human body or any other 
part of it“ and that their exclusions from patentability could only be justifiable on 
“public policy as being, in the language of the Statute of Monopolies, “generally 
inconvenient”.”174 We can determine from this, unlike the decision in C & W’s 
Application, that medical methods are indeed inventions in line with the Statue, 
and would thus be patentable, save any public policy exclusions. This ruling 
undermined the decision in C & W, since it dismissed the notion that medical 
methods of treatment were not economic in nature. It also paved the way for 
providing a more genuine justification for the possible exclusion of medical 
methods from patent eligibility than was shown in C & W’s Application.  
 
In 1994, the case of Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (Rescare)175 
was brought before the Federal Court and the method concerned sleep apnoea 
(a snoring sickness with potentially serious side effects) and its treatment, in 
which there was both a device and a treatment. In this case at first instance,176 
it was ruled that such a method was not ‘generally inconvenient’ and that the 
method would be patent eligible. It was also the view of the judge (Gummow J) 
that it would be illogical to conclude that products for human treatment would 
be eligible for patents, but methods for treatment would not be.  
 
The decision was appealed, and in the Full Court it was agreed (not 
unanimously) that Gummow J’s ruling had been correct in determining that 
under Australian patent law, medical methods of treatment were patent 
eligible.177 Lockhart J and Wilcox J were in agreement for the most part that 
Australian law contained no provision that excluded medical treatment 
processes from patentability. Lockhart J also mentioned the Patent Act of 1990 
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and made the observation that if it had been the desire of Parliament to deny 
patent eligibility to medical methods of treatment, the express provision would 
have been included there. Instead, section 18(2) states: ‘‘Human beings and 
biological processes for their generation, are not patentable inventions’’, with 
no mention of processes or methods.  The third judge was in strong 
disagreement with the majority, claiming the ‘generally inconvenient’ provision 
from Section 6 of the Statue of Monopolies should be applicable here on 
grounds of incompatibility with public policy.    
 
Subsequent to Rescare, granting of patents for methods of medical treatment 
were granted with more frequency. It wasn’t until the case of Bristol Myers 
Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd in the mid ‘90s that the issue rose to light 
once more.178 This case concerned two method patents for the administration 
of a cancer treatment drug known as Taxol. At first instance in the Federal Court 
the judge (Heerey J) concluded that the decision in Rescare was not binding 
as a ratio decidendi, but instead was merely an obiter statement (i.e. not a 
binding precedent in common law rules), and thus dismissed both patents as 
invalid on the grounds of their being generally inconvenient from the 
perspective of public policy. 
 
This decision, however, was appealed, with the Full Court overturning Heerey 
J’s ruling in order to comply with the majority ruling in Rescare, with Lehane J 
stating on the issue of: “the insurmountable problem, from a public policy 
viewpoint, of drawing a logical distinction which would justify allowing 
patentability for a product for treating the human body, but deny patentability 
for a method of treatment.”179 In terms of medical patents as whole, this line of 
reasoning would appear to be the most salient, since if medical methods are 
denied patent eligibility on grounds of morality or some other public policy, it 
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stands to reason that patenting drugs or medical devices would also be contrary 








More recently, the case of Apotex180 in 2013 seems to have given more 
certainty to the status of medical treatment methods in terms of their 
patentability. The case concerned a method of treatment by therapy, in which 
a method of administering a previously known medicine for the treatment for 
psoriasis as a subsequent use was patent eligible. Thus the ‘manner of 
manufacture’ decision in NRDC (see page 17 above), which is the only possible 
invalid ground brought by Apotex against Sanofi that was accepted as grounds 
for a case by the High Court was reinforced in this case. French CJ stated as 
follows: “The exclusion from patentability of methods of medical treatment 
represents an anomaly for which no clear and consistent foundation has been 
anunciated… [M]ethods of medical treatment…cannot today be conceived as 
“essentially non-economic.””181  
 
 
With that said, the court raised the issue (but did not make a direct ruling) on 
the difference between such medical methods, i.e. one such as the case at 
hand, which involves the therapeutic use of an already-known medicine, and 
other methods e.g. physical methods of treatment used by healthcare 
professionals when treating patients. According to Kiefel and Crennan JJ: “To 
the extent that such activities or procedures involve ‘a method or process’, they 
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are unlikely to be able to satisfy the NRDC Case test…they are not capable of 











4.1. Conflict of interest  
A ‘conflict of interest’ is an oft-raised concern when it comes to patenting 
medical methods of treatment. The issue appears to stem primarily from the 
belief that if, for instance, a doctor should obtain a licence (for a fee) to perform 
a particular method to aid in his or her treatment of a patient, the inclination 
would be to favour that method to the possible exclusion of other methods. This 
reasoning supposes that the doctor’s moral, ethical and/or professional 
judgement would be clouded by the cost of obtaining the licence, and he or she 
would thus feel (perhaps unwittingly) compelled to use that purchased method 
of treatment in order to obtain a return on the cost of the license. This is to say, 
the financial recompense in using the patented method could potentially 
interfere with the practitioner’s ability to recommend the most suitable and 
effective treatment for the patient in his or her care. This issue could also be 
argued to the contrary, i.e. that a doctor might choose to decline the 
recommendation of the most suitable method of treatment so as to avoid paying 
for a licence to use it.183 In fact, according to the TBA, the reasoning behind 
Article 52(4) in EPC 1973 was “to prevent any obstacle to the freedom to 
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choose the best medical treatment to be applied to a patient and to avoid any 
delay in the application of such medical treatment” and furthermore that ‘[s]uch 
obstacles or delays could arise if a medical treatment were the subject of an 
exclusive patent right’.  
 
That said, it goes against a doctor’s code of ethics not to act in the best interests 
of the patient, and a doctor’s failure to inform said patient of all the treatments 
methods available to him or her would certainly be contrary to those ethics. Not 
only that, but the laws regarding medical malpractice would surely also serve 
to deter a physician from neglecting to inform a patient about a suitable medical 
method of treatment, or indeed by choosing to perform a method without 
sufficient reason.184  
 
As we saw in the case of Pallin, a worthwhile suggestion might be to pay 
royalties, since it would eliminate any pressure on doctors to pay large license 
fees in advance, which would presumably go some way towards guaranteeing 
that the doctor provides his or her patients with the most suitable methods 
available. This would remove any pressure on doctors to recoup losses arising 
from the purchase of a license. Of course, Dr Pallin failed in his patent claim 
case, but that was more so on the grounds of absence of novelty, since the 
method was already in use elsewhere before he attempted to patent it (see 





                                                     
184 See, for instance, the case of Moore v Regents of University of California, which concerned a 
patient’s right to know the reasoning behind a doctor’s decisions.  
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4.2 Restriction of Information  
 
Owing to the lengthy patent system, the resulting patented method may take 
several years before it becomes available, meaning that the specifics regarding 
the invention’s details will inevitably face some delay. Of course, it is a well-
established fact in the medical world that information is disseminated through 
the publication, thus the fear is that if new methods are begin patented, it will 
affect this dissemination severely. Of course, because of this publication 
tradition, any prospective inventor must be careful not to publish details of the 
potentially patentable invention before filing for a patent, since such disclosure 
might serve to render the ‘novelty’ aspect of the invention invalid.  
 
In respect of this, some in the medical community are of the opinion that 
patenting medical discoveries hinders information dissemination to the 
community at large.185 However, the publication of a new medical process can 
take place with immediate effect, without hindering the patent process, provided 
the filing takes place within the allotted time limit.  It is also possible to argue 
that investors might attempt to claim intellectual property rights over procedures 
developed and shared by others, an argument that also goes against the 
fundamental purpose of patenting. The argument overlooks the other 
requirements of novelty and the inventive step, not to mention the chance to 
challenge any claims with regard to patents. The patent system has been 
developed over the years to prevent situations like this one.  
 
As mentioned above, it is already widely understood that the dissemination of 
ideas is vital for the progression of the medicine and the medical world in 
general. That said – the above concerns notwithstanding – by adopting the 
stance that patents would hurt the world of medical methods, one is ignoring 
the fact that the very fundamental purpose of patents is to improve the 
                                                     
185 Wang (1995) at 40-42 
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dissemination of information, in accordance with the storehouse theory. It must 
also be remembered that when filing a for a patent, the invention must be fully 
and thoroughly described, which is not a requirement for a journal article. 
Furthermore, it is useful to keep in mind that there may also be delays with 
article and journal publications. “Patent Convention Treaty applications are 
required to be published 18 months after filing, and in some countries inventors 
are required to publish immediately after filing (EPC article 54(2)).”
186 
 
Moreover, if patents are not permitted or available, an inventor (e.g. a doctor) 
may choose to keep a method secret, a method that is far more damaging to 
the sharing of information than patenting.  
 
 
4.3 Fear of infringement 
 
A genuine concern raised by those who oppose the patenting of medical 
methods it the fear of infringing on another’s intellectual property in the course 
of their duties. There are, however, many different obstacles that lie before a 
doctor performing his or her duties. There are many deciding factors before a 
medical practitioner when faced with a patient, such as malpractice concerns, 
insurance and consent, long before the fact of patent considerations come to 
the fore.   
There is also the existence of the doctrine of necessity, a doctrine that serves 
to protect doctors in an emergency should they use a patented method. This 
arguments against patenting medical methods of treatment because a medical 
professional will hesitate in an emergency situation do not hold much water, 
since patenting emergency procedures would seem decidedly unlikely, owing 
                                                     
186 Mitnovetski et al (2004) 
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to the aforementioned doctrine of necessity which would render that claim null 
and void. As an aside, it is also true that such fear of infringement cannot 
necessarily exist in the US, for instance, since it is not possible to sue another 
physician for the use of your patent.187 
 
 
4.4 Rising costs in healthcare 
 
In many jurisdictions, the price of healthcare is already significant, and one 
concern is that medical method patents will force these prices to rise even 
higher. In light of the costs of drugs and medical devices however, this 
argument seems somewhat spurious, given the protection afforded to such 
products. It fails to address the central question: why can products and devices 
remain eligible for patenting, while methods cannot? It is also possible that such 
an investment in treatment would eventually reduce the overall cost of the 
healthcare costs, because of more efficacious treatment at an earlier stage in 
the treatment lifecycle. Wendy Yang, for instance, makes the argument: “[F]or 
procedures that would have been developed even if a patent were not available, 
society pays a price for a benefit it would have received without the grant of the 
patent monopoly.”188 This reasoning can give rise to some scepticism, since it 
seems to dispense with the idea of patents encouraging the incentive-to-
innovate, but only when considering medical methods.  
 
Those in support of medical procedure patents, on the other hand, claim that 
royalties can be merited where a significant amount of the funding for 
development has come from private parties, who have funded the research and 
development on the expectation or at least the possibility of profiting from any 
licence arising from the technology. Of course, it remains the case that much 
                                                     
187 35 U.S.C § 278(C) 
188 Yang(?), at 19. 
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of this funding is for the development of medicines and devices and not towards 
methods, thus any increase in cost would be decidedly small in comparison. 
The medical world is certainly quite a litigious one, but excluding methods of 
treatment from patentability on the grounds of possible cost increases would 


































5. Further thoughts and conclusions 
 
5.1 The future of medical methods of treatment patentability 
 
This paper has examined the exclusion of medical methods and treatments 
from patent protection in the member states of the EPC, the inclusion thereof 
in the USA and Australia, along with some questions and insights into medical 
advancement such as AI and some of its possible repercussions for this patent 
law. While the law will always be somewhat lagging in terms of legislating for 
scientific progress, at present it appears as though the status quo is likely to 
remain i.e. that such creations, regardless of their level of innovation or 
inventiveness, will remain unpatentable, particularly if the method or treatment 
is risky or invasive. It will be interesting to observe the effect in law if (or perhaps 
rather when) the number of medical methods/treatments that employ AI (at 
least as part of the process) increases, whether the number of inventors 
seeking patents will rise accordingly, and what the reactions of the judiciary will 
be and whether or not their views on the present legislation might change. After 
all, if a medical method or treatment uses AI in some form, could it not be 
argued that it might be far less likely that e.g. other medical practitioners are 
using the same processes? Thus, its widespread use in the community might 
not be relevant at the time of invention, greatly reducing the fear of patent 
infringement as grounds for patent refusal.  
 
 
Furthermore, another outcome to consider is that it is certainly possible that 
over time the advancement of AI in these areas of surgery, therapy and 
diagnostics will become so sophisticated that the risks associated with certain 
methods may reduce significantly, which may in turn lead to a redefinition of 
what is eligible for patent protection. The curious nature of the development of 
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the reasons for this provision also cannot be disregarded, and if the 
fundamental reason for the exclusion is indeed to protect patients, it is to be 
presumed that the law will update accordingly when such protection would no 
longer be required. Thus the current reasons for the exclusions themselves 
may yet become firstly a medical and thereafter a legal fiction.   
 
 
5.2 AI and its (un)patentability in medical treatments and methods 
 
Having discussed the nature of patent exclusions for medical methods and 
treatments, what implications (if any) will AI technology have for this area of 
patent law? One question surrounding the use of AI generally has concerned 
the nature of intellectual property law when the creator of the product warranting 
protection is not human. If we narrow the focus to areas of law discussed above, 
some questions that seem pertinent include: if the methods and treatments are 
excluded on the aforementioned grounds of public health, will it matter if the 
method is performed by an AI? If we are to deduce from this public policy 
argument that the crux of the issue lies in the fact that the method is performed 
on a human or animal, it may still prove very difficult to obtain such a patent. 
Linked to this notion is the statement in the EPO Guidelines that the exclusions 
do not depend on the person carrying out the method189, so for instance if the 
executor of the process in not a person, does the law remain the same?  
 
 
In light of this, it is useful to examine whether or not any such patents that 
concern artificial intelligence and medical methods or treatments might exist. 
One interesting patent award concerned a device for eye surgery. While we 
already know that devices are not excluded from patentability under art 53(c), 
the EPO expressly pointed out the difficulties with such patents, especially if 
they prove difficult to separate from the method: “For some inventions in 
medical technology, however, it is not easy to determine whether they 
encompass a medical method in the first place and it may also not be possible 
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to draft a patent application on a device without having to relate to the method 
as such”190, and imaging methods for surgeries were cited as a good example 
of this. So, while it might appear unfair that an eye device for eye surgery can 
receive a patent but imaging methods during surgeries cannot, the fundamental 
reasoning behind it must be borne in mind, namely keeping medical 
practitioners free of restraint in the course of their profession. The crux of the 
issue regarding this distinction between devices and methods perhaps can be 
attributed to the fact that a device is presumably far less likely to be invented 
by many different creators coincidentally, thus such an invention by one 
individual or company is unlikely to put other individuals at risk of infringement 
if that device is patented, a situation believed not to be true of medical methods 
and treatments.  
 
 
Given this reasoning from the EPO that medical methods and treatments are 
generally not patentable on public health grounds, and the difficult and costly 
efforts involved in bringing methods into use, it is certain that those creating 
these inventions (or supervising an AI in creating them) will seek the assistance 
of the law in helping to protect their products or processes from unjust 
duplication or dissemination. But what if the law does not go far enough? Who 
knows how many invaluable medical methods are currently protected as 
confidential, i.e. trade secrets? This is understandable from the view of one who 
does not wish to disclose their creation for fear of not obtaining a patent and 
wants to maintain a competitive edge, but such a practice is hardly in line with 
the interests of public health policy. In the words of W Nicholson Price II: “While 
secrecy may be an effective intellectual property strategy, it runs headlong into 
the concerns raised…about safety, malpractice and regulation”.191 In the 
abovementioned summary of the EPO Patenting Artificial Intelligence 
Conference, this concern is addressed: “From the perspective of innovation for 
the benefit of society, there should be as much incentive as possible for 
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191 Price, W (2017), p 12 
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innovators to disclose AI innovations – such as the algorithms and how they 




5.3 Final conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the patentability of medical methods of treatment 
in three jurisdictions: the countries signatory to the EPC, the USA, and 
Australia, in an effort to compare their varying approaches to the subject of the 
patentability of methods of medical treatment. The aim of the discussion was to 
highlight and compare the differences in approach to the issue that have been 
taken by the legislature in each location.  
 
 
As outlined above, personalized medicine involves tailoring medical treatment 
to each patient on an individual level. The idea is to use the breakthroughs in 
scientific understanding to study an individual’s genetic and molecular 
idiosyncrasies in order to better comprehend and identity the possible illnesses 
to which they may be genetically predisposed. Through this, it can gradually 
become easier to decipher which medicines will be best suited to each patient, 
and which medicines may be dangerous. This closing section will discuss the 
possible ramifications of patentability or its exclusion from patentability on this 
type of healthcare. 
 
As discussed earlier regarding the current position of patentability in the USA, 
the INO case decision gives rise to many questions that presently remain 
unanswered regarding the future of medicine patents in terms of personalised 
medicine. Prior to INO, the earlier Vanda decision was a welcome clarification 
in the aftermath of the Mayo decision in terms of when it came to patenting 
medical methods. It brought a new and welcome certainty level to the subject 
matter eligibility questions since the Mayo case. In fact, UPSTO guidance in 
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the wake of Vanda declare that “it is not necessary for method of treatment 
claims that practically apply natural relationships to include nonroutine or 
unconventional steps to be considered patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” 
 
 
As we saw in Mayo, patents that depend on interrelationships with laws of 
nature to create diagnostic tests were denied, since the Supreme Court held 
that these interrelationships were merely based on natural principles. This 
decision created much doubt regarding the patentability of a significant range 
of therapies and methods. “These include proteins, kinases, colony-stimulating 
factors (such as growth factors), peptides, antibodies, viruses, and venoms. It 
also means that advances in personalized medicine, which hold significant 
promise for curing an array of diseases, may no longer be patent-eligible.”193 
The decision of the Supreme Court not to consider the case of Hikma further, 
however, means that for the time being, such methods can be awarded patent 
status, while of course “because medical procedure patents constitute statutory 
subject matter, the legislation resorted to prohibiting patent owners from 
enforcing their right to collect damages for infringement.”194 This decidedly 
strange ‘halfway house’ approach to the issue will hopefully be revisited by 
Congress in the near future, since the nullification of the right to recoup 




In Australia, after a chequered case law history, the issue of whether medical 
methods of treatment can be patentable was settled in the case of Apotex, 
although the question remains uncertain regarding methods that do not involve 
the subsequent use of medicines, but rather methods physically practised by 
healthcare professionals on their patients. In any case, IP Australia have stated 
that objections cannot be made to “methods of processes for the treatment, 
medical or otherwise, of the human body or part of it, only on the basis that the 
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human body is involved.”195 Moreover, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
does not hold the view that medical treatments methods involving genetic 
technology and material should be excluded, on that grounds that such an 
exclusion would hamper investment in “biotechnology, medical research and 
innovation in healthcare.”196 This is a statement that could be applied to many 
treatment methods outside of those concerning genetic technology, which 
seems to be the aim of the Australian legislature, at least for the present. 
 
 
As for the EPC, it is the only jurisdiction of the three to have expressly excluded 
methods of medical treatment from patentability, an exclusion it shares with 
countries such as New Zealand and Canada. The discussion stemmed from 
the fact that the exact reasoning for this exclusion remained unclear, beginning 
with these methods being insusceptible of industrial application which was 
admitted as being a legal fiction. The case of MEDI-PHYSICS gave the EBA 
the opportunity to state what they believed to be the genuine intent behind the 
exclusion: “[T]he principle has been confirmed that medical and veterinary 
practitioners’ freedom to use the best available treatments to the benefit of their 
patients uninhibited by any worry that some treatment might be covered by a 
patent is protected by excluding these activities from patentability.”197 While this 
is a relevant concern, it does little to alleviate the issue of incentive to innovate, 
which is perhaps hampered in the countries signatory to the EPC. In the 
interests of public health, the encouragement of research and development, as 
well as the controlled formulation and dissemination of new information, it would 
seem more fruitful for the EPC to allow methods of medical treatment the 
possibility of patentability on a case-by-case basis, rather than their express 
exclusion, whether that exclusion remains based on a ‘legal fiction’ or 
otherwise. As it stands, the words of Black CJ and Lehane J198 in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (quoted at the outset of this discussion) still ring true, since the 
sometimes contradictory actions of the legislature in their efforts to address this 
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issue mean that the logical distinction between permitting a patent for a product 
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